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Abstract 
 
In 2005, mortgage interest, capital deductions and insurance premiums (MICPD) were assembled 
into one single deduction package to further stimulate home ownership in Belgium. Former research 
has shown that the MICPD did not raise the probability of becoming a home owner, due to its 
capitalisation into higher house prices. The objective of this paper is to investigate how the 
transmission of the capitalisation takes place. The analysis is based on data extracted from the 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The mortgage amount, the mortgage maturity, the 
interest rate and the house price are estimated simultaneously using a 3-SLS approach. The results 
suggest that the mortgage deduction does not result in more affordable housing by shortening the 
mortgage maturity. Most likely, the mortgage deduction results in larger amounts being borrowed, 
which in turn may indirectly push up house prices, the mortgage maturity and the interest rate as 
well. Although our estimation sample is rather small, these results suggest that the MICPD might be 
more beneficial for sellers and mortgage-granting institutions than for home owners. 
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1. Introduction 
In  Belgium,  like  in  many  other  countries,  becoming  a  home  owner  gives  access  to  sizeable  tax  
benefits. The deductions in the personal income tax for mortgages were introduced in 1989. 
Mortgage interest payments qualified for a deduction, whereas capital amortisations were eligible 
for a tax credit. Mortgage protection insurance premiums could be eligible for a tax deduction or a 
tax credit, depending on certain conditions. As this system was very complicated, the tax benefits for 
interest payments, capital amortisations and mortgage insurance premiums were regrouped in a 
single deduction in 2005 (henceforth the MICPD). The purpose of the reform was to further increase 
the home ownership rate. 
All mortgages of at least 10 years, which are taken out to construct or purchase the household main 
residence,  are  eligible  for  the MICPD if  the borrower does  not  possess  other  dwellings.  The MICPD 
can be enjoyed throughout the whole loan term. The main differences from the previous systems are 
that both mortgage-takers can enjoy the MICPD in all couple households1 and  the  maximum  
deductible amount no longer depends on the borrowed amount. The size of the net benefit depends 
on the tax bracket, which means that higher-income households get a larger tax benefit. The 
maximum deduction, which is indexed annually, amounted to 2 280 euros in the income year 2014. 
During the first  decade of  the loan maturity,  a  mark-up of  760 euros  is  allocated.  If  the household 
counts three or more children, the deduction is further increased by 80 euros. Table 1 shows the 
total net tax benefit a single household or a couple household can acquire over the life of a 20-year 
or  a  25-year  fixed-rate  loan.  Two  remarks  can  be  made.  First,  the  size  of  the  net  benefit  is  quite  
considerable. Second, the household’s marital status and its tax bracket can lead to strongly varying 
tax benefits. 
As  far  as  we  know,  Belgium  is  the  only  country  with  a  combined  deduction  for  interest  costs  and  
capital2. Contrary to most mortgage interest deduction (MID) systems3, having diminishing tax 
benefits over time, here the size of the deductions depends on the monthly repayment of a fixed 
amount  over  the  lifetime  of  the  loan4. As a fixed deduction facilitates the calculation of the net 
benefit, rational and fully informed agents are expected to take this into account in their housing 
decision. Households might benefit from the MICPD in three ways: it could stimulate 
homeownership, affordability and the quality of the household’s main residence. First, credit-
constrained households might qualify for a mortgage now, while they did not without the MICPD. 
Second, non-constrained households might use the MICPD to increase their monthly amortisation. A 
higher monthly amortisation ensures a faster repayment of the loan and consequently lowers 
interest rates. This would make housing more affordable. Third, households who can afford a home 
                                                             
1 In the previous system, only married mortgage-takers could enjoy a double benefit.  
2 Spain and Portugal respectively had a tax credit for both interest cost and capital repayments from 1999 until 
2012 and from 1998 until 2012. In Austria, acquisition and construction costs could be deducted together with 
other special expenses (Sonderausgaben) like pension fund premiums, insurance premiums and donations. 
From 1980 onwards, interest costs could be included as well. However, no deduction for mortgage 
amortisation can be claimed If the special expenses bucket is already filled up with other expenses. 
3 The Statistical Appendix from the European Commission (2012) gives an overview of the different deduction 
systems. 
4 This only applies to fixed-interest mortgages, which is generally the preferred type of home loan in Belgium. 
But it is likely that the deduction for adjustable-interest mortgages is relatively stable over the loan life as well. 
First, for most mortgages, the yearly amortisation largely exceeds the maximum deduction. Only a cut in the 
mortgage rate could lower the deduction. Over long periods of time, mortgage rates generally tend to rise. 
Moreover, the share of the capital amortisations in the total amortisation will increase when the pay-off period 
shrinks, which counters the declining mortgage rates.  
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without the MICPD might use the tax benefit to acquire a higher quality dwelling. Yet, recent 
research by Hoebeeck & Smolders (2014) casts some doubt on taxpayers’ awareness of the potential 
benefits  of  the  MICPD.  In  October  2013,  1  190  households  participated  in  a  survey  at  the  BIS  
construction fair in Ghent. The purpose of the questionnaire was threefold. The first aim was to get 
to know how well households were informed about the MICPD. Second, questions were included to 
learn if the MICPD could encourage them to become homeowners or to afford a larger dwelling and 
whether they responded to the MICPD in terms of the amount and maturity of the mortgage to be 
taken out. Finally, respondents were asked for their opinions on several reform proposals. An 
analysis and discussion of the survey findings can be consulted in Hoebeeck & Smolders (2014). As 
the majority of the households in the sample recently acquired a dwelling or were planning to 
purchase or build a dwelling soon, it was assumed that the respondents were well-informed. 
Surprisingly, this was not the case: 38 percent of the respondents had never heard of the MICPD 
before. Moreover, half of the households that were familiar with the MICPD had no realistic idea 
about the size of the tax benefit. In general, households said they did not take the MICPD into 
account when deciding on the details of the mortgage for the household main residence. These 
results are consistent with the Fannie Mae Housing Survey which questioned 2 000 American 
households in 1998. The majority of the surveyed households do not consider tax deductions when 
determining their housing budget.  
Table 1: Size of the total tax benefit over the loan life 
loan 
maturity tax rate 
single HH with 3 or 
more dependent 
children 
single HH with less 
than 3 dependent 
children  
couple HH with 3 or 
more dependent 
children 
couple HH with less 
than 3 dependent  
children 
20 years 
50% € 25 590 € 25 240 € 51 180 € 50 480 
45% € 23 031 € 22 716 € 46 062 € 45 432 
40% € 20 472 € 20 192 € 40 944 € 40 384 
30% € 15 354 € 15 144 € 30 708 € 30 288 
25% € 12 795 € 12 620 € 25 590 € 25 240 
25 years 
50% € 31 290 € 30 940 € 62 580 € 61 880 
45% € 28 161 € 27 846 € 56 322 € 56 322 
40% € 25 032 € 24 752 € 50 064 € 50 064 
30% € 18 774 € 18 564 € 37 548 € 37 548 
25% € 15 645 € 15 470 € 31 290 € 31 290 
Note: It is assumed that both partners of a couple are in the same tax bracket. From 2015 onwards, the annual deductible amount is no 
longer indexed. 
 
The analysis of the Household Budget Survey (Hoebeeck & Smolders, 2015) provides further 
evidence that the MICPD is not beneficial for potential homeowners. A hedonic regression model 
shows that housing actually becomes less affordable due to the price-increasing effect of the MICPD. 
This effect can only be felt if the MICPD is included in the housing bid. Because most households do 
not take the MICPD into account, its effect on house prices should channel through in a different 
way. As only mortgage-takers can enjoy the MICPD, the mortgage market may be an important 
transmission channel. Only when consulting a financial institution or a mortgage broker can 
candidate buyers get advice on the extra amounts they can borrow due to the MICPD. The financial 
institutions, which are well informed about the MICPD, may include the net benefit of the MICPD in 
the maximum amount a household can borrow, which indirectly adds the deduction to the housing 
bid. This implies that the financial institutions may benefit from the MICPD as the higher loan 
amount might increase the mortgage costs as well. Moreover, financial institutions might turn the 
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MICPD to their advantage by incorporating it in the mortgage rate or by encouraging borrowers to 
extend the mortgage maturity, which would enable them to enjoy the MICPD benefits for a longer 
period.  However,  it  is  unlikely  that  this  extra  tax  benefit  would  offset  the  higher  interest  costs  
originating from a longer maturity.  
This paper investigates whether the mortgage market is actually an important transmission channel 
for the MICPD to feed into higher house prices. The Belgian sample of the Household Finance and 
Consumption Survey (HFCS) will be used to disclose the transmission channel. First, the direct impact 
of the maximum annual net tax benefit from the MICPD on the mortgage characteristics of Belgian 
households is estimated simultaneously with its impact on house prices. More specifically, we will 
examine whether the tax benefit leads to larger mortgages of longer duration with higher interest 
rates,  rather  than to  more affordable  mortgages.  Second,  the indirect  effects  of  the tax  benefit  on 
the household’s mortgage characteristics and house price will be calculated, as we are interested in 
the total effect of the tax benefit. In the third part of the analysis, we explore whether the changed 
borrowing characteristics affect the quality of household residences. As the HFCS dataset only 
contains details on the size of the dwelling, we estimate if the tax benefit has induced households to 
buy larger dwellings. Last, we examine whether the tax benefit affected mortgages granted after the 
purchase of the house differently than purchase mortgages.  
Although our estimation sample is small, the results suggest that the maximum annual net benefit of 
the MICPD pushes up the house price indirectly through its direct effect on the amount borrowed. 
We find that an increase in the maximum annual net benefit of €100 would increase the borrowed 
amount by 2.5% and house prices indirectly by 1.5%. As the maximum annual net benefit varies 
between €915 and 2 975 in our sample, the MICPD may increase the mortgage amount considerably. 
No  direct  effect  of  the  tax  benefit  is  observed  on  the  mortgage  maturity,  the  interest  rate  or  the  
house price. The indirect effects on the mortgage maturity and the mortgage rate are rather small,  
except for the highest tax benefits. In these cases, the mortgage maturity may indirectly increase by 
more than a year and the mortgage rate by 0.5 percentage points, which can have a significant effect 
on  the  total  interest  costs.  The  results  of  the  house  size  regressions  suggest  that  the  extra  money  
borrowed on the mortgage is not used to acquire a better quality dwelling, unless the mortgage is 
taken  out  for  construction  or  renovation  work.  But  it  is  very  likely  that  the  MICPD  makes  most  
housing less affordable. Furthermore, the higher mortgage may increase the interest costs and the 
notary and credit insurance fees. It seems that sellers and financial institutions will more likely 
benefit from the MICPD subsidy than homeowners will. For renovation or expansion mortgages, the 
MICPD might be more beneficial for he households. The extra amount borrowed might be used for a 
higher quality renovation or expansion project.  
We contribute to  the literature by investigating the impact  of  the MICPD on the Belgian mortgage 
market using microeconomic survey data. The Belgian case is of particular interest, as the maximum 
deduction remains the same during the first ten years of the loan. Although the effects of MID 
systems on home ownership have been extensively studied, evidence of their impact on the 
mortgage market is rather limited. This study could offer some important insight into the role of the 
mortgage market as a transition channel for tax benefits to feed into house prices. By disclosing the 
transmission channel, the paper seeks to raise the awareness of policy-makers on the possible side 
effects of a given tax benefit. Although their intentions might be good, it is important that 
government leaders consider all the repercussions these benefits might have for other markets. 
Next, this paper models the mortgage maturity, the mortgage amount, the interest rate and house 
prices simultaneously. As far as we know, no other studies have investigated the impact of a tax 
subsidy on these four household decision variables in one model. Finally, we estimate the impact of 
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the MICPD at the households’ point of decision, whereas most studies examine the effect of a tax 
benefit on the number (e.g. Bover et al.,  2014;  Jappelli  &  Pistaferri,  2007)  and  the  amount  of  
outstanding loans (e.g. Follain & Dunsky, 1997; Follain & Melamed, 1998; Jappelli & Pistaferri, 2007; 
Ling & McGill, 1998).  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  introduces  the  Belgian  mortgage  
market. Section 3 gives some theoretical considerations and discusses the international evidence on 
the effect of tax benefits on mortgage characteristics. Section 4 describes the Belgian sample of the 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey and the construction of the variables. The same section 
also discusses the empirical model and some methodological issues and it explains how to calculate 
the  direct  and  indirect  effects  of  the  MICPD.  Section  5  reports  the  empirical  results  and  some  
robustness checks. This section also presents a simple model to test whether the MICPD enables 
households to buy larger houses and an estimation of the MICDP effect on the mortgages taken out 
after the acquisition year. The last section concludes.   
2.  Introduction to the Belgian mortgage market 
Chart 1 shows the financial liabilities of Belgian households over the last 15 years. From 1998 until  
2001, total household debt (as percentage of GDP) remained relatively stable, whereas it doubled in 
the period afterwards. Mortgages have always constituted the main debt category and its share is 
still  rising.  The outstanding mortgage debt  increased from 58 938 million in  1998,  covering 64% of  
the total household debt, to 181 778 million in 2013, constituting 77% of the total household debt.  
Chart 1: Financial liabilities of households (amount outstanding in % of GDP) 
 
Source: NBB Stat, Online Database (Other financial statistics), 2015. 
 
Chart 2 shows changes over time in the different purposes of contracting a mortgage. The average 
mortgage rate is also displayed. The number of new mortgages increased for all mortgage types in 
2005. Based on this graph, it is hard to say whether this increase is only caused by falling interest 
rates  or  whether  the  MICPD  inflated  the  size  of  the  mortgage  as  well.  Chart  2  also  reveals  that  
mortgage demand did not encounter any lasting crisis effect. Mortgage lending for purchasing or 
constructing a home declined slightly in 2008 and 2009, but demand soon recovered thanks to 
several anti-crisis measures. On the one hand, the VAT on new-builds was reduced from 21% to 6%, 
which boosted demand for construction mortgages. On the other hand, the beneficial tax treatment 
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of “green loans” between 2009 and 2011 promoted the demand for renovation mortgages. These 
mortgages for energy-saving investment qualified for an interest rebate of 1.5% points and a 40% tax 
reduction. After the abolition of the green loan measure, the number of renovation mortgages fell 
back to its pre-reform level. The different peaks in the refinancing loans coincide with falling nominal 
mortgage rates.  
Chart 2: Trend in the number of new mortgages according to the purpose of the loan (in 1000; on right axis) and change in 
the mortgage rate (in %; on left axis)  
 
Source: NBB Stat, Online database (Other financial statistics), 2015 & semi-fixed mortgage rate CGER/Fortis Bank/BNP Paribas Fortis  
Bank, 2015. 
 
Chart 3 plots the transactions on the primary and the secondary real estate market against the 
accompanying  mortgage  loans.  We  observe  a  clear  MICPD  effect  on  the  secondary  market.  All  
transactions from 2005 onwards are financed with a mortgage5, whereas before the introduction of 
the MICPD, only 80% of transactions were funded with a mortgage. For new builds, the gap between 
the number of new dwellings and mortgages for construction only narrowed in 2009 and in 2010 due 
to the green loan measures. We can think of several reasons why the MICPD has not increased the 
number  of  mortgages  on  the  primary  market.  First,  new  real  estate  is  often  built  by  construction  
firms  which  are  not  eligible  for  the  MICPD.  This  would  also  explain  the  increasing  gap  from  2012  
onwards as there is a growing trend towards buying a dwelling from property developers rather than 
building one’s own house with a private contractor. Second, new real estate is generally more 
expensive than buying an existing dwelling, which means that it is more affordable for richer 
households who do not need a mortgage. Moreover, these richer households have a higher 
probability of possessing other real estate and hence do not qualify for the MICPD.  
 
 
                                                             
5 Of course, there are households with multiple mortgages, but it does not change the fact that the gap 
between transactions and mortgages has narrowed remarkably since 2005.  
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Chart 3: Construction of new dwellings and purchases of existing dwellings and their mortgages (in 1000) 
 
Source: FPS Economy (Statistics, Economics, Construction & Industry), 2015 & NBB Stat, Online Database (Other financial statistics), 2015. 
 
The average amount  borrowed for  each type of  mortgage loan and the average dwelling  price  are  
displayed in chart 4. The average mortgage amount is calculated by dividing the total credit granted 
by the number of mortgages. Nowadays, home buyers borrow between 45% and 60% more than 
they did in 1998. The average amount borrowed on the primary market has risen by 36% over the 
last 15 years. However, since 2004 the mortgage amount has no longer kept up with real estate price 
rises. In its 2012 Financial Stability Review, the NBB describes three household groups that might be 
responsible for the lower average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.  First, there is a trend for young 
households to buy a provisional dwelling before buying a larger final home. After a few years when 
the  first  dwelling  is  sold,  the  capital  gains  on  the  sale  can  be  used  to  lower  the  LTV  of  the  new  
dwelling. Second, in 2004, a one-off tax amnesty measure for unreported income was adopted, 
which might have stimulated the reinvestment of this money in real estate. Last, households who can 
afford a house without a mortgage would nevertheless contract one to enjoy the tax benefit of the 
MICPD. As these households are only borrowing the minimum amount to optimise the tax benefit, 
their LTV ratios are rather low as well (NBB, 2012).   
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Chart 4: Changes in amounts borrowed (base year= 2010) 
 
Source: NBB Stat, Online Database (Other financial statistics), 2015 & FPS Economy (Statistics- Economics- Construction & Industry), 2015. 
 
Finally, chart 5 shows that Belgian households generally prefer 20-year, fixed-interest-rate loans. 
Variable-interest-rate loans only predominated in 2004 and 2010, probably because of the large gap 
between the long-term and the short-term interest rate in those years. The average maturity of new 
mortgages went up from 16.5 years in 2005  to 18 years in 2010 (Central Individual Credit Register, 
2010,  p.  8;  De  Doncker,  2006,  p.  8).  Increasing  interest  costs,  relaxation  of  lending  standards  and  
securitisation might partly explain the longer mortgage maturities, but the MICPD may have played a 
role in it as well.  From 2011 onwards, the average loan maturity started to fall again due to a more 
stringent policy of granting mortgage loans (Centrale voor kredieten aan particulieren, 2011, 2012, 
2014).  
 
Chart 5: Share of fixed-rate mortgages (in %; left axis) and the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates (in 
%; right axis) 
 
Source: Financial Stability Review NBB (2011, Chart 6 Mortgage market developments in Belgium ) & OECD Economic Outlook Statistics and 
Projections (2015). Note: The long-term and short-term interest rates are based on Belgian government bonds. 
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3. Theoretical considerations and International evidence  
3.1 Theoretical considerations 
The impact of the mortgage interest deduction (MID) on housing is typically modelled in user cost 
models. In the simplest one, where maintenance costs, depreciation and expected capital gains are 
ignored, the cost of owner-occupied housing depends on the house price, the interest on mortgage 
or equity financing and the marginal tax rate on interest income. Three possible effects of the MID 
can be deducted from this simple model. First, the MID can lower the cost of investing in housing in 
comparison with investing in other non-deductible assets. This might boost housing demand, as 
concluded by Laidler (1969), for example. Second, the MID may change the relative costs of owning 
versus renting which affects tenure choice. H.S. Rosen and Rosen (1980) and Green and Vandell 
(1999) used this user cost approach to explain the increase in home ownership in the US. Several 
authors investigated both effects simultaneously (e.g. Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002; H S Rosen, 1979, 
1985). Third, households might favour mortgage financing over equity because of the MID. In Follain 
and Dunsky (1997) households determine the cheapest combination of equity and mortgage 
financing depending on the after tax mortgage rates and the cost of equity financing. In the situation 
of a similar pre-tax cost of equity finance and mortgage debt, households would optimally choose 
mortgage finance after the introduction of the MID.  
However, unless there is perfect supply elasticity, the rising demand for housing and/or mortgages 
will (partly) result in higher house prices. Since the discussion between Adams (1916) and Seligman 
(1916) about the possible beneficiaries of property taxation, this effect has been known as 
capitalisation in the economics of taxation and real estate literature. Capitalisation is short for the 
adjustment in the capital value of a property (Jensen, 1937), which occurs because the expected 
income of the property changes. Imposing a property tax would result in a lower selling price of the 
taxed dwelling in comparison with a similar non-taxed dwelling as the lower expected income is 
capitalised in a lower price. Likewise, a tax exemption will raise the value of exempt properties in 
comparison with non-exempt properties, as the expected income of the potential owner will be 
higher. In case of the MID, the capitalisation is generally assumed to accrue to the original owners, to 
real estate companies or to construction firms (e.g. Bourassa & Grisby, 2000; Bourassa, Haurin, 
Hendershott,  &  Hoesli,  2013;  Cho  &  Francis,  2011;  Gale,  Gruber,  &  Stephens-Davidowitz,  2007;  
Glaeser  & Shapiro,  2002;  Hanson,  2012b;  Hilber  & Turner,  2014).  However,  Hanson (2012a)  points  
out that lenders can benefit from the MID as well. He doubts the assumption of an exogenous pre-
tax mortgage rate and observes higher mortgage rates for MID eligible mortgages. He concludes that 
on average 9 to 17% of the MID benefit is accrued by the mortgage lenders. Likewise, we also want 
to  test  if  the  lenders  capture  a  share  of  the  MICDP  benefits.  Unlike  in  Hanson  (2012a),  we  allow  
lenders to benefit through other mortgage characteristics than just through the mortgage rates. Two 
arguments explain this decision. First, Hanson’s evidence that the MID benefits are offset by higher 
mortgage  rates  might  be  biased,  as  the  authors  do  not  take  into  account  the  endogeneity  of  the  
mortgage amount. Second, by disregarding mortgage maturity, the authors assume that the MID’s 
impact on the mortgage rate is the same, regardless of the number of years the tax deduction can be 
enjoyed.  
The fixed Belgian deduction is comparable to the tax relief on British endowment mortgages. 
Devereux and Lanot (2003) compared their additional tax relief with the tax relief on standard 
repayment mortgages in the UK. Endowment mortgages consist of two parts: an interest-only-
mortgage and an endowment premium, which is invested by insurance companies. The additional tax 
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relief on endowment mortgages arises because its interest payment is fixed over the loan life, 
whereas standard repayment mortgages have declining interest payments. The imperfectly 
competitive insurance sector offsets the benefits of the MID by charging higher endowment 
premiums. Lenders are found to capture 77% of the additional tax relief for endowment mortgages. 
The dependent variable, the share of monthly income dedicated to mortgage repayments, does not 
make it possible to distinguish in which mortgage characteristics the benefits are captured by the 
lenders.  In the next section, we will give a brief literature overview on the possible effect of interest 
deduction systems on mortgage characteristics.  
A  user-cost  model  for  Belgium was estimated by van den Noord (2003),  who modelled the cost  of  
borrowing in 1999.  However, he only took the regular interest deduction into account. The 
additional mortgage deduction6, which usually implied a larger benefit, was completely ignored. The 
cost of borrowing since 2005 is even harder to model as the share of the interest cost diminishes and 
the capital payment share increases over time. As both capital payments and interest costs are 
eligible for the MICPD, the MICPD not only affects the cost of borrowing but also the net borrowed 
amount. Modelling the user costs implies estimating calculating the monthly payment before and 
after taxes. As the monthly payment depends on the mortgage amount, the interest rate and the 
loan maturity, it seems more interesting to investigate which of these factors is affected by the tax 
benefit. Considering the effect of the tax benefit on the monthly payment only could be misleading, 
as this payment can remain unchanged while its underlying determinants change. Therefore, we will 
model the impact of the MICPD on the main mortgage characteristics instead of estimating a user-
cost model.  
 
3.2 International evidence
In the US housing literature, several papers explore the effect of tax deduction systems on household 
debt. Follain and Dunsky (1997) estimate the elasticity of mortgage amount with respect to a cut in 
the tax rate at which the mortgage interest is deductible.  Depending on the period estimated, an 
elasticity of -1.5 to -3.5 is found. For higher-income households, the elasticity is about -4.  Follain and 
Melamed (1998) calculate the effect of the mortgage deduction being scrapped altogether in the 
United States. They find that the aggregate demand for mortgage debt would be 41% lower. Ling and 
McGill (1998) estimate housing consumption and mortgage debt simultaneously to account for the 
endogeneity of the house price in the mortgage amount equation. However, they do not focus on 
the effect of the MID on house prices. Only a proxy for the tax rate at which households can deduct 
their mortgage interest is included in the mortgage debt equation. They confirm earlier results that 
lowering  the  tax  rates  or  completely  abolishing  the  MID  reduces  mortgage  demand.  Maki  (2001)  
provides additional evidence for the effect of tax deductions on the mortgage market. Owing to data 
unavailability, the author examines the changing pattern of the interest paid over time instead of the 
outstanding debt. The 1986 Tax Reform Act phased out consumer debt deductibility over a 5-year 
period. A difference-in-differences analysis shows that the total interest paid on outstanding 
consumer debt decreased for high-income homeowners but not for high-income renters after the 
reform. Scrapping the tax deduction has induced high-income home owners to substitute their 
consumption credit for mortgage credit.  
In the European housing literature, the evidence of an MID effect on the mortgage market is mixed. 
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2007) use a difference-in-differences analysis to investigate the impact of the 
1992 Italian tax reform on the outstanding mortgage amount. Mortgage interest deductions were no 
                                                             
6 See the last but one paragraph in section 4.1 
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longer dependent on the marginal tax rates of the households after the reform. A flat tax rate was 
introduced which should have increased mortgage demand for households with lower marginal tax 
rates and reduced it for households with higher marginal tax rates. However, the results do not show 
a clear relationship between the change in the tax benefit and the size of the mortgage. The authors 
attribute the absence of any effect to borrowing constraints and the lack of financial literacy. The 
borrowers probably are not sufficiently aware of the consequences of the reform to change their 
mortgage  demand.  Applying  the  same  methodology  to  a  comparable  reform,  Saarima  (2010)  
observes a positive impact of the Finnish MID on mortgage demand. The 1993 Finnish tax reform 
replaced the progressive tax deduction by a constant tax rate, as in the Italian case. As the 
outstanding mortgage amount is not available in the Finnish Income Distribution Survey, the size of 
the annual interest payments is used as a proxy. The reform caused interest payments to rise for 
those households with marginal tax rates below the constant tax deduction rate. Households with 
higher tax rates reduced their mortgage demand after the reform. Surprisingly, the authors did not 
include the interest rate as a control variable. The latter obviously affects the annual interest 
payments.  
Bover et al.  (2014)  test  for  a  sample  of  11  European  countries  if  the  availability  of  a  mortgage  
deduction system inflates the mortgage amount. Although they find a positive effect, it is not 
significant. Different reasons might explain this result. First, their country-dummy variable does not 
take into account the size or duration of the deductions, nor the share of households that can 
actually benefit from the deduction. Second, all but two countries in the sample have a tax deduction 
for mortgage interests, so it is possible that the MID dummy variable captures another fixed effect 
for these two countries, rather than estimating the true impact of the mortgage interest deduction. 
Finally, the model disregards house prices, which is the main determinant of the mortgage amount. 
Martins and Villanueva (2006) do find an effect of the Credito Bonificado programme on long-term 
household borrowing in Portugal. The programme, launched in 1986, offers an interest subsidy up to 
44% for lower income households wanting to purchase a house. The subsidy reduces the monthly 
amortizations immediately as it was directly given to the lenders. From 1998 onwards, houses with a 
selling price above a certain ceiling are no longer eligible for the programme. The authors show that 
the original Credito Bonificado programme increased mortgage amount and that the amount is more 
concentrated around the house price ceiling after the reform. The authors stated that banks did not 
offset the subsidy by higher interest rates. However, they did not discuss the benefits lenders could 
enjoy by increasing the mortgage supply up to the subsidy limit.   
None of the above studies estimates the effect of the tax deduction on the initial mortgage amount. 
The use of the initial mortgage amount would assure a more precise estimate of the tax deduction 
effect as it avoids that the dependent variable is influenced by early redemption, overdue 
repayments or refinancing. Moreover, the tax deduction can only affect the initial mortgage 
characteristics on the loan origination date.  Hendershott, Pryce, and White (2003) do estimate the 
loan-to-value  ratio  at  the  start  of  the  mortgage  loan.   They  investigate  the  effect  of  a  complete  
elimination of the MID relative to a fictional full deduction on about 117 000 UK loans between 1988 
and 1998. As the MID was limited to loans up to £30 000, they estimate the change in the loan-to-
value for households with loans above and below the £30 000 ceiling. The loan-to-value ratio 
declined  with  19  to  34%  for  the  credit-  constrained  households  and  with  40  to  78%  for  the  
unconstrained borrowers. The aggregate loan-to- value decline was about 30%. In later work, 
Hendershott and Pryce (2006) also take the borrowing constraints of households into account as they 
can only borrow up to the value of the financed home. Moreover, they allow the loan-to-value ratio 
to differ between age groups and between first-time owners and previous owners. Scrapping the full 
mortgage deduction causes mortgage demand to drop by 17% to 23%. This decrease is smaller than 
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in their previous study due to the inclusion of constrained borrowers who cannot reduce their loan 
amount. First-time home owners experienced a drop of 7 and 16 % for the age groups 25-34 and 45-
54 years  respectively.  Previous  home owners  encountered a  drop of  12 and 35% for  the same age 
groups. Morrizumi (2000) investigates the impact of a tax exemption dummy on the Japanese 
mortgage demand at loan origination date but finds no robust effect. Raya and Kucel (2016) estimate 
the impact of the Spanish mortgage interest and capital deduction on mortgage demand and 
mortgage maturity in a simultaneous model. A 1% increase in the ratio of the present value of the 
total tax benefit over the loan life on the property price is found to raise mortgage demand by 1.6 %. 
No explanation was given for the simultaneous 2% drop in mortgage maturity. 
Although these studies theoretically model mortgage demand, the empirical analyses make use of 
the mortgage amount7, which is also influenced by mortgage supply. None of the studies considered 
the possibility that lenders might attempt to benefit from the tax incentive as well. Lenders might 
inform borrowers about the larger amounts they can borrow due to the tax benefit. Larger mortgage 
amounts give rise to higher interest payments, which are beneficial to the lenders.  
Other studies explicitly investigate the impact of the interest deduction on the mortgage maturity. 
Dhillon, Shilling, and Sirmans (1990) prove that a tax deduction is an important determinant of 
choosing between a 30-year loan and a 15-year loan in the United States. They test the impact of the 
tax benefit of the mortgage interest deduction by including the ratio of the tax benefit for 15-year 
loans on the tax benefit for 30-year loans. A 10% reduction in the interest tax disadvantage of the 15-
year mortgage increases the probability of choosing a 15-year mortgage by 30%. Vruwink and Fisher 
(1995) investigate the net cash difference between a 30-year and a 15- year mortgage, which arises 
due to the lower monthly payments and the higher tax deduction of a 30-year loan. If the net cash 
difference  is  well  invested,  it  is  possible  to  obtain  a  higher  return  with  a  30-year  mortgage  than  
paying off faster and starting to invest after the repayment of the loan. The higher the marginal tax 
rate, the greater the net cash difference will be, which should induce higher income households to 
take out longer loans. These findings are confirmed by Baek and Bilbeisi (2011) who use Monte Carlo 
simulations to decide between a short- and a long-term mortgage. The mortgage maturity studies 
only consider the demand side as well. However, as the mortgage maturity granted rather than that 
demanded is analysed, the supply side should not be ignored. It is possible that lenders encourage 
their borrowers to opt for longer maturities, under the pretext of longer benefits, to get longer 
interest payments.  
4. Dataset and model specification  
4.1 Data
The Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) will be used to test our hypotheses. The 
HFCS dataset is interesting for our analysis as it collects an extensive range of information about a 
household’s borrowing behavior. The first wave of the HFCS collected household-level data on the 
finances and consumption of 2 327 Belgian households in 2010. This sample is chosen to be 
representative at the country level (ECB, 2013). Stratified sampling is used to select the households, 
with region and average income by neighbourhood of residence as stratification variables. The 
mortgage-related  variables  need  to  be  representative  as  well  to  permit  inference  for  the  Belgian  
mortgage  market.  Appendix  1  compares  some  mortgage  statistics  from  the  HFCS  sample  with  the  
mortgage market characteristics we discussed in section 2.  As Appendix 1 shows that the mortgage 
                                                             
7 Except for Ling and McGill (1998), who estimate the desired mortgage amount with a latent variable 
approach. 
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characteristics in the HFCS sample do not differ drastically from Belgian mortgage market 
characteristics, the HFCS dataset can be used to extend the conclusions of the empirical analysis to 
the Belgian mortgage market.  
Three  types  of  loan  are  reported  in  the  HFCS:  the  mortgage  loan  for  the  main  residence,  other  
mortgage loans and non-collateralised loans.8 We will only consider the first type, as it is the only one 
that can qualify for the MICPD. The households receive detailed questions about the two largest 
outstanding loans of each type. Next to the purpose of the loan, they provide information on the 
year  the  loan  was  taken  out  or  the  last  time  it  was  refinanced,  the  initial  amount  borrowed,  the  
maturity of the loan and its interest rate. 74 % of the households surveyed own all  or part of their 
residence and 38% of this group have at least one outstanding mortgage loan for the household’s 
main residence (HMR). All refinanced mortgages are removed from the sample as only the original 
mortgage makes it possible to calculate the tax benefit of the MICPD over the loan maturity. 
Mortgages taken out for other purposes than the acquisition or the renovation of the HMR are 
dropped from the sample.  Two mortgages, which are both eligible for the MICPD9 but are taken out 
by the same household, are deleted from the sample as well. It is impossible to estimate the impact 
of  the  MICPD  on  the  total  borrowed  amount  or  the  maturity  of  the  loans,  as  we  cannot  just  
aggregate both mortgages.  Next, observations with missing values for the crucial variables, like the 
origination year of the mortgage, are eliminated. In order to prevent biased results, observations 
with house prices outside the [€ 40 000 to € 650 000] interval are dropped from the sample. Initial 
mortgages which do not exceed € 10 000 or exceed € 550 000 are deleted as well. 10 The final sample 
consists of 414 mortgages that were taken out between 1981 and 2010. Two types of mortgage can 
be distinguished. The first type are mortgages granted to acquire the household’s main residence. 
These  mortgages  are  taken  out  in  or  prior  to  the  acquisition  year.  The  second  type  of  mortgages,  
which are taken out after the acquisition of the home, might have been contracted for renovation or 
remodelling purposes, buying co-owners out after an inheritance or a divorce, or for an expansion of 
the residence. As these mortgages can be eligible for the MICPD as well, we will investigate whether 
the MICPD affects them differently than the acquisition mortgages. The final sample consists of 346 
mortgages of the first type and 68 mortgages of the second type. 
  
                                                             
8 Only a limited number of households have other mortgage loans besides the mortgage for their main 
residence. These mortgages are used to finance a holiday residence or real estate, rented out or used for 
business activities. About half of the HFCS sample has at least one non-collateralised loan. These loans are 
mainly used to finance a vehicle purchase or other large purchases. Although a mortgage seems a more 
appropriate choice, some households take out non-collateralised mortgages to finance housing-related costs.  
9 Mostly two mortgages taken out in the same year.  
10 We restrict house prices and borrowed amounts to a bound of the first quartile minus 3 times the 
interquartile range and the third quartile plus 3 times the interquartile range. 
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The dependent variables, mortgage amount (A),  mortgage maturity (M),  the mortgage rate (R) and 
house price (H), are all examined at the loan origination date. The mortgage amount is the logarithm 
of the initial amount borrowed when the loan was first granted. The consumer price index with base 
year 2010 is used to express the mortgage amount in real prices. Mortgage maturity is the number of 
years that were agreed for the length of the loan when the loan was granted. The house price is the 
household’s answer to the question how much its main residence was worth at the acquisition date. 
We assume that this amount equals the selling price of the house as the household agreed to acquire 
the house at this particular price.11  For mortgages taken out before or after the acquisition year, we 
adjust  the  house  price  to  reflect  the  value  in  the  mortgage  year.   To  this  end,  the  house  price  is  
assumed to have changed with the general movement in prices of the average Belgian dwelling.  The 
house price variable is always expressed in logarithms and in 2010 prices. 
The explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 2. The mortgage characteristics are all observed at 
the loan origination year, except for the interest rate for the adjustable-rate mortgages, which is the 
rate since the last fixation. Unfortunately, the HFCS does not contain sufficient information to 
calculate the initial adjustable mortgage rate. The real mortgage rate is calculated according to the 
Fisher equation. For some household characteristics, like its average age, number of children and 
employment status, it is trivial to retrace them back to the loan year. The household income requires 
more effort. We use the household’s permanent income as an explanatory variable instead of the 
household income at loan origination date, as the latter cannot be calculated. Moreover, using the 
permanent income has two advantages. First, the permanent household income is a better 
determinant  of  the  house  price  (Goodman  &  Kawai,  1981;  Page,  1964)  and  the  mortgage  
characteristics (Dhillon et al., 1990) than the household income. Second, using the permanent 
income of the household avoids endogeneity, as it is less closely correlated with the household 
characteristics at the loan origination date. In order to estimate the permanent income, we use 
Goodman’s (1998) human capital model. This model considers the current income as a function of 
the permanent income and a transitional component. As the permanent income depends on the 
human capital characteristics and some demographics of the household, the fitted value of the 
current gross income on a household’s human capital characteristics proxies the permanent income 
of the household. The permanent income regression is shown in Appendix 3. The adjusted R² is 0.45 
which is larger than the R² found by Raya and Garcia (2012), who use the same method for a larger 
sample.   
The HFCS contains only two housing characteristics: the house size and the dwelling type (existing 
dwelling or new construction). The house size is provided in brackets, hence we assume that the 
house size has only varied between those brackets since the loan origination year. This assumption is 
not too strict, as none of the mortgage takers in our sample has taken out a second mortgage after 
the loan year to expand or renovate the dwelling. Moreover, it is unlikely that a household 
downsized. 
                                                             
11 We assumed the house price measure to be equal to the selling price exclusive of taxes. If a household did 
not believe the value of its dwelling was worth the selling price, it would not have paid that price. It is possible 
though that the household believes the main residence is worth more than what it has paid for it. However, 
there is no way of controlling for this possible overvaluation relative to the selling price. Moreover, we cannot 
be certain that the house price measure includes taxes. However, we can assume that all households, which 
are advised by the interviewers, answered the question in the same way. It is most likely that households who 
constructed their home report the house price with VAT included, whereas households who purchased a 
residence on the secondary market report house prices without registration tax.  
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The HFCS dataset is particularly interesting for our analysis as it contains both the loan origination 
year and the acquisition year of the household’s main residence. This enables us to determine for 
each household if the borrowers qualified for the MICPD at the start of the loan.  All households who 
have taken out  a  mortgage loan since 2005 to  purchase or  renovate their  main residence qualified 
for the MICPD if the mortgage had a maturity of at least ten years and the household did not own 
other properties prior to the start date of the loan. Out of the 346 mortgages in the sample, 112 are 
eligible  for  the  MICPD.  We  will  investigate  the  impact  of  the  maximum  annual  net  benefit  of  the  
MICPD. We prefer the net benefit,  as the actual benefit of the MICPD is determined by the income 
tax  rate.  Moreover,  we  will  use  the  annual  benefit  of  the  MICPD  as  it  does  not  depend  on  the  
mortgage maturity. We also choose to use the maximum benefit instead of the effective benefit, as it 
does not depend on the mortgage amount or the mortgage rate.   
 
As  the  size  of  the  net  benefit  depends  on  the  tax  bracket  one  is  in,  we  need  to  know  the  taxable  
income of each household. The estimated gross permanent income is divided into three income 
categories in order to calculate the taxable share of each category. We assume that the share of each 
income category in the permanent income at the loan origination date is the same as its share in the 
survey  year.  The  total  permanent  income  consists  of  the  sum  of  the  permanent  income  from  
immovable property, the permanent earned income and the permanent income from movables.12 
Social security contributions and fixed expenses are deducted from the permanent labour income to 
calculate the taxable earnings. The matrimonial coefficient is applied to the taxable earnings of 
married and legally co-habiting households. This means that a share of the labour income of the 
highest earner is allocated to his/her partner, if  the partner gains less than 30% of the total earned 
household income. Income from movable assets is subject to a separate tax rate and thus is not 
taken into account to determine the tax bracket for the MICPD deduction. The gross property rent is 
added  to  the  taxable  earned  income  as  it  is  subject  to  the  same  tax  rate.  If  the  taxable  income  
exceeds the tax-free minimum13,  the tax rate (t) for each taxpayer is determined according to table 
2.14 For the sake of convenience, the tax rates for 2010 are used for all calculations. As there were no 
major changes in the tax system from 2005 to 2010, it is unlikely that this assumption will affect our 
conclusions. The tax rates did not change over the considered period, but in some years the tax 
brackets were adapted slightly to correct for inflation and rising income. Moreover, the lender who 
grants the mortgage cannot consider future tax changes. 
Table 2: Tax rates 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 We disregard miscellaneous income as only eight households in our sample reported having received income 
from this category and we have no further information of the source of this income, which makes it impossible 
to calculate the taxable share.  
13 The tax-free minimum is EUR 6 690 for taxpayers whose taxable income is lower than €23 900 and € 6 430 
for taxpayers with a higher taxable income. The tax-free minimum rises for each dependent child and the 
increase is higher if the child is less than 3 years old.  
14 Appendix 4 shows the number of households per tax rate for couple and single households. 
Tax bracket (2010 prices) Tax rate (t) 
€0 - €7 900 25% 
€7 900 - €11 240 30% 
€11 240 - €18 730 40% 
€18 730 - €34 330 45% 
> €34 330 50% 
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The annual deductible amount (DA) is determined by the annual amortisation if it does not exceed 
the maximum deduction. In the first 10 years of the mortgage, the maximum deduction (ܦܣଵ ) is 
increased by € 690 and an extra increase can be obtained for households with three or more children 
in the year following the acquisition year (C=1). 
ܦܣଵ = min(2770 + 70ܥ,ܽ݉݋ݎݐ݅ݏܽݐ݅݋݊) (1) 
ܦܣଶ = min(2080,ܽ݉݋ݎݐ݅ݏܽݐ݅݋݊) (2) 
As said before, we will only use the maximum deduction, as it is not determined by the dependent 
variables. Moreover, the deductible amount equals the maximum deduction for all but 21 mortgages 
in  our  sample.  For  each mortgage-taker,  we calculate  the maximum annual  net  tax  benefit  for  the 
first 10 years of the mortgage (ܶܤଵ) and for the remaining amortisation period (ܶܤଶ). The maximum 
annual net tax benefit depends on the income tax rate t and the municipality tax rateݐ௠.   As  the 
HFCS dataset does not contain location characteristics, we use the average municipality tax rate in 
2010, which is 7.4%.15 The annual maximum net tax benefits are expressed in €100. 
ܶܤ் = ൣܦܣ் כ ൫ݐ כ (1 + ݐ௠)൯൧/100 (3) 
For eligible households,  ܶܤଵ ranges from 9.15 to 29.75 and ܶܤଶ ranges from 6.70 to 22.43. The left-
hand limit is the maximum annual net tax benefit of a couple household with three children, in which 
one household head does not pay income tax and the other one has a marginal tax rate of 30%. The 
right-hand limit is the maximum annual net tax benefit for a couple household without children, in 
which both household heads have a marginal tax rate of 50%. For non-eligible households, thus also 
for all the households who took out a mortgage prior to 2005, ܶܤ் equals zero.  
Ideally, we should also include the tax benefit systems prior to the MICPD in our estimation model. 
Unfortunately, the HFCS does not make it possible to calculate the tax benefit prior to 2005 due to 
the  complexity  of  the  system.  Before  1989,  there  were  two  systems.  From  1963  until  1986,  the  
interest was deductible up to the real estate income. Capital amortisations for social dwellings where 
fully deductible, whereas the deduction was limited for normal dwellings. Large dwellings did not 
qualify for a deduction. In 1986, the deduction limit of new builds was extended and an additional 
interest deduction for new builds and renovation mortgages was introduced. From 1994 onwards, a 
tax credit replaced the capital deduction. The HFCS dataset does not enable the real estate income to 
be calculated for the start year of the mortgage.  A different system for capital amortisations and for 
interest costs prevents the calculation of an annual tax benefit, as it will differ yearly. Construction or 
renovation mortgages qualified only for the additional interest deduction when the construction or 
renovation costs exceeded a certain limit. The eligibility for the additional mortgage deduction also 
depended on the age of the dwelling. Unfortunately, this kind of information is not available in the 
HFCS. Moreover, as capital amortisations were entitled to a tax credit, calculating a household’s 
marginal tax rate is not sufficient to calculate the net benefit, as the total taxes owed to the 
government are needed too. In section 4.3, we will explain how we deal with the unobserved tax 
benefits prior to 2005.  
 
The HFCS provides five different imputed values for missing values to reduce the uncertainty of the 
imputation. A detailed description of the imputation process can be consulted in the HFCS  database 
                                                             
15 The municipality tax rate varied between 5.7 and 8.8% in 2010. 
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description file (European Central Bank, 2012). All analyses are performed for each imputation file. 
The results presented in this paper are combined results across the five imputations.16   
 
4.2 Selection bias
As only outstanding mortgages are observed in the HFCS dataset, we have to cope with a selection 
bias problem. Chart 6 illustrates this problem clearly. Mortgages that were taken out in 1980 should 
had a  maturity  of  at  least  30 years  to  be observed in  2010;  mortgages  that  started in  1990 need a  
maturity of at least 20 years to shown up in the dataset. We apply a two-stage Heckman procedure, 
as described in Woolridge (2009, Chapter 17 ), to solve the selection bias problem. In the first stage, 
a probit regression estimates the probability of being selected in our sample. Therefore, the sample 
is extended to unselected households. These are the households in the HFCS sample who became a 
homeowner between 1980 and 2010 but who no longer had an outstanding mortgage in 2010. As 
almost all owner-occupied dwellings are financed with a mortgage, it is a reasonable assumption that 
the unselected households once had a mortgage as well, but that it is already paid off in 2010. 
Appendix 5 shows the first-stage regression.  We used two predictors to estimate the probability of 
being selected in the sample. A dummy variable for retirement of the homeowners negatively affects 
the selection probability, as retired homeowners are less likely to obtain a mortgage. Households 
who own a second property in the survey year are more likely to have repaid their mortgage for their 
first home. Following Woolridge’s advice, we added all the exogenous variables of the simultaneous 
equation model to the selection model as well. The acquisition year, the household age in the 
acquisition year, the house size and having a job in the financial sector also affect the participation 
probability. Using a cut-off value of 0.5, the selection model correctly assigns 81% of the households 
to the right group. Hence, we can use the estimated probability of being selected in the model to 
calculate the inverse Mills ratio ఝ(௬ො)
ʣ൫௬ොത൯
. In the second step, this ratio is added to the simultaneous 
equation model.  
Chart 6 Selection bias 
  
Data source: HFCS (2013) 
 
                                                             
16 The estimated coefficients are averaged across the five imputation files.  Standard errors and R² are 
calculated according to Rubin (1987) and Harel (2009). 
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4.3 The empirical model 
In order to test whether the MICPD is capitalised through the mortgage market instead of directly 
through the housing bid, we will investigate in one model how the maximum annual net tax benefit 
affects the mortgage maturity (M),  the mortgage amount (A),  the mortgage rate (R) and the house 
price (H).17  
As the households decide simultaneously on the house price and the mortgage characteristics, there 
is some contemporaneous correlation between the error terms of the four equations. Equation by 
equation estimation is consistent but not efficient as the error terms of each loan will be correlated 
across the different equations (Gujarati, 2004). A seemingly unrelated regression will take this 
simultaneity bias into account. The model can be represented as:  
 
 ܯ௜ = ߙଵ + ߛଵଶܣ௜ + ߛଵସܪ௜ + ߛଵଷܴ௜ + ߚଵܺ௜ଵ + ߜଵܶܤ்௜ + ߝ௜ଵ (4) 
 ܣ௜ = ߙଶ + ߛଶଵܯ௜ + ߛଶଷܴ௜ + ߛଶସܪ௜ + ߚଶܺ௜ଶ + ߜଶܶܤ்௜ +  ߝ௜ଶ (5) 
 ܴ௜ = ߙଷ + ߛଷଵܯ௜ + ߛଷଶܣ௜ + ߛଷସܪ௜ + ߚଷܺ௜ଶ + ߜଷܶܤ்௜ +  ߝ௜ଷ (6) 
 ܪ௜ =  ߙସ + ߛସଵܯ௜ + ߛସଶܣ௜+ߛସଷܴ௜ + ߚସܺ௜ସ + ߜସܶܤ்௜ + ߝ௜ସ (7) 
 
where ܺ௜௝ is a vector of exogenous variables for household i used in equation݆, ܶܤ் is the maximum 
annual  net  tax  benefit  of  the  MICPD  for  the  first  10  years  (ܶ=  1)  or  for  the  remaining  mortgage  
maturity (ܶ=2), ߝ௜௝ are the error terms which are correlated across the four equations. The exogenous 
ܺ௜௝variables include mortgage characteristics, household characteristics, dwelling characteristics and 
some other variables, as explained in Appendix 2. The ߜ௝ coefficients measure the impact of the 
maximum annual net tax benefit on respectively the mortgage maturity, the mortgage amount and 
the house price, which is the focus of our paper. 
To ensure that each equation is identified, the order and rank conditions need to be fulfilled. The 
order condition states that the number of variables excluded from an equation must be equal to or 
greater than the number of endogenous variables in the model less one (Gujarati, 2004 , p. 748). In 
practice, this means that at least three variables in ܺ௜௝ has to be restricted to zero in each equation. 
In the mortgage maturity equation, we set the variables interest on government bonds, mortgage 
purpose, second mortgage for HMR, two mortgage-takers, inheritance or gift, other property 
mortgage, nest leavers, new house and acquisition year to zero, as those variables only indirectly 
affect mortgage maturity through the mortgage amount, the mortgage rate or the house price. The 
interest on government bonds is the main determinant of the basis mortgage rate. Except through its 
effect on the mortgage rate, it does not affect mortgage maturity. The mortgage purpose may affect 
the mortgage maturity indirectly through several channels; however, there is no direct effect of the 
mortgage purpose on mortgage maturity.  The mortgage purpose determines the required mortgage 
amount and it may affect the mortgage rate and the house price. Households who only borrow the 
renovation budget have more financial means and are thus more creditworthy. A possible lower 
mortgage rate might be the result. As the mortgage purpose indicates whether the house requires 
renovation  work,  it  can  also  directly  affect  the  house  price.   A  second mortgage for the HMR 
                                                             
17 According to Haurin and Lee (1989), the length of stay has to be modelled simultaneously with the mortgage 
amount as well. Households decide how long they will stay in the house before they purchase it and before the 
mortgage is taken out. Although their arguments seem valid, our dataset does not make it possible to calculate 
the expected length of stay in the house. 
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obviously reduces the size of each mortgage. It may also push up the households’ risk premium and it 
indicates that the house is more expensive. As those factors increase the total monthly payment, the 
mortgage maturity might be extended indirectly as well. Two mortgage-takers have a higher 
permanent income and thus can afford a larger monthly payment and indirectly a shorter mortgage 
maturity. Two mortgage-takers may also indirectly affect maturity through a downward effect on the 
mortgage rate premium. An inheritance or gift prior to the acquisition year might induce households 
to buy a more expensive house and it may reduce mortgage demand, but it has no direct effect on 
mortgage maturity. Possessing a mortgage for a property that is not the HMR may reduce a 
household’s down payment, which indirectly extends mortgage maturity through a higher borrowed 
amount, but there are no direct effects. Households with nest leavers, children of 18 years or older, 
will experience a rise in disposable income in the near future when their children leave the house. 
This induces those households to borrow more now. Possibly, it also lowers the risk premium on the 
mortgage rate. However, the nest leavers variable does not directly affect the mortgage maturity, as 
a higher future income does not change the repayment period at the start of the loan. A new house 
only indirectly affects the mortgage market through the house price and possibly through a higher 
mortgage  amount.  As  a  new  house  also  entails  higher  costs,  like  higher  notary  fees,  the  mortgage  
amount might be pushed up directly too. The continuing rise in house prices is captured by the 
acquisition year. There is no need to include this variable in the mortgage equations, as general 
changes in the mortgage market are already included in the amount of the mortgage and the interest 
rate on it. 
In the mortgage amount equation, we exclude the variables interest on government bonds, variable 
mortgage rate, two mortgage takers, household age, financial sector, number of children, house size 
and acquisition year. Borrowing-constrained households are more likely to choose a floating-rate 
mortgage (Johnnson & Geng, 2014; Linneman & Wachter, 1989). An upward revision of the 
adjustable mortgage rate might hamper consumption smoothing of constrained borrowers less when 
they have longer maturities. A dummy for adjustable-rate mortgages is thus included in the 
mortgage maturity equation. Changing the mortgage amount does not smooth interest changes and 
thus we do not include the mortgage rate in the mortgage amount equation. Two mortgage-takers 
might be allowed to borrow more as they may have a lower mortgage rate and a higher permanent 
income. Those determinants are already included in the mortgage amount equation, so there is no 
need to include the two mortgage-takers variable as well. The household age in the acquisition year 
represents the expected life expectancy, which directly affect mortgage maturity. Household age also 
proxies a household’s life stage which determines the housing amount. However, age only indirectly 
affect the mortgage amount through its effect on the permanent income. Financial sector employees 
often get a variable wage depending on the number of mortgages, savings accounts, and on other 
financial products they sell. Therefore, their income is volatile, which makes them opt for longer 
maturity mortgages to lower the probability of default. The mortgage amount (both supply and 
demand) depends on the average wage, which is already captured by the permanent income. 
Mortgage supply does not depend on the number of children. Mortgage demand only indirectly 
depends on the number of children through an effect on the house price, the mortgage maturity and 
the mortgage rate. House size only indirect affects mortgage amount through the house price and 
possibly the mortgage maturity too.  
In the mortgage rate equation, we exclude the variables inheritance or gift, other property mortgage, 
household age, new house, house size and acquisition year. A  household’s  mortgage  rate  is  
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determined by its credit risk and the standard mortgage rate.  An inheritance or gift only indirectly 
affects the credit risk through a lower mortgage demand and a higher house price. Unlike a second 
mortgage for the HMR, a mortgage for another property does not affect the creditworthiness of the 
household as the other property guarantees the repayment of that mortgage. The household age 
might affect credit risk through permanent income and mortgage maturity. As those variables are 
already included in the mortgage rate equation and we cannot think of any other reason why the 
household  age  would  affect  the  credit  risk,  we  restrict  it  to  zero.   The  house size and type only 
indirectly affects the credit risk through the house price and the mortgage rate.  
In the house price equation, the coefficients on the variables interest on government bonds, variable 
mortgage rate, two mortgage-takers, other property mortgage, financial sector, tertiary education, 
number of children and nest leavers are  restricted to  zero.  The interest on government bonds does 
not affect house prices differently than through the mortgage rate. Whether the mortgage is of fixed 
or variable rate does not affect house prices directly either. Two mortgage-takers may have higher 
house prices, as they have a higher permanent income, a higher mortgage amount and a lower 
mortgage rate than single mortgage-takers. A mortgage for property different from the HMR may 
only indirectly affect the house price through its effect on the mortgage amount. Similarly, the house 
price does not depend on the volatile income, but on the permanent income. The financial sector 
variable is thus restricted to zero in the house price equation. Households with tertiary education 
might end up with shorter mortgages than households who studied less, because the risk of 
becoming unemployed is lower and they may be more informed about the extra cost of longer loans. 
The future income prospects of those with tertiary education lowers  the  risk  for  the  credit  
institutions, which may affect the amount lent and the mortgage rate. Moreover, more highly-
educated households have a higher permanent income as well. As these variables are already 
controlled for in the house price equation, higher education can only affect house prices indirectly. 
The number of children is excluded from the house price equation as this variable only affects the 
house price through the required house size, which is already included. Nest leavers do not influence 
the house price either as they still live in the house for a couple of years. 
The ܶܤ variable occurs in every equation in order to reveal the transmission of the capitalisation. The 
parameterߜ will capture the variation in the maximum annual net tax benefit across the eligible 
mortgage takers. As the tax benefits prior to 2005 cannot be calculated, we add a dummy variable 
for the period since 2005 in each equation. This dummy controls for other factors that might have 
affected the mortgage market since 2005. It avoids events like the 2004 fiscal amnesty measure18 
being captured by the tax benefit variable. The inverse Mills ratio is added to the mortgage maturity 
and the mortgage amount equation. We do not include the inverse Mills ratio in the mortgage rate 
equation and the house price equation as high correlations between this variable and respectively 
the interest on government bonds and the acquisition year cause multicollinearity. The rank condition 
will  be  tested  after  estimation.  An  equation  is  identified  if  the  matrix  from  the  coefficients  of  the  
variables excluded from that equation is of full rank (Gujarati, 2004, p 752).  
                                                             
18 As a permanent fiscal regularisation was introduced in 2006, the fiscal amnesty measure existed almost for 
the whole period since 2005. It might have affected the mortgage market and house prices as a large share of 
the repatriated money might have been invested in the housing market Baugnet, Butzen, Cheliout, Melyn and 
Wibaut (2011). 
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Seemingly unrelated regression would be biased as all four equations contain endogenous right-hand 
side variables. As three-stage least squares (3SLS) combine seemingly unrelated regression with two-
stage least squares (2SLS), this is the preferred method for our analysis. Moreover, it is shown that 
the estimation of an equation with 3SLS is more efficient than 2SLS if the other equations are over-
identified  (Zellner  &  Theil,  1962),  which  is  the  case  for  all  four  equations.  However,  if  one  of  the  
structural equations is misspecified, 2SLS is more robust as the incorrectly specified equations will 
not  affect  the  other  equations  (Woolridge,  2010).  For  the  latter  reason,  we  will  estimate  a  2SLS  
regression as robustness test. The same instrumental variables, i.e. all the exogenous explanatory 
variables of the whole system, are used for all four equations. A Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions will be performed to test the exogeneity of our instruments. The fourth equation will be 
dropped for mortgages taken out after the acquisition year as the MICPD for these mortgages can no 
longer affect the acquisition value of the house.  
4.4 Indirect and direct effects  
The model estimation model contains feedback loops as the dependent variables are appearing on 
both the left-hand and the right-hand side of the equations. The right-hand-side variables can thus 
indirectly affect the left-hand-side variables as well. The estimated regression coefficients only 
represent the direct effect of explanatory variables, but as we are interested in the total effect, we 
will  calculate  the indirect  effects  as  well.  The total  indirect  effect  of  a  variable  is  the sum of  all  its  
indirect paths. For example, the explanatory variable permanent income might have one direct and 
three indirect effects on mortgage amount. The indirect effects can occur through the mortgage 
maturity, the mortgage rate and the house price variables. Equation (8) and (9) represent the matrix 
notation of our model, where X includes all the explanatory variables ݔ௜  of the model that are not 
appearing as left-hand side variables as well. The parameter ȳ gives the direct effect of the 
endogenous explanatory while B provides the direct effects from the exogenous or instrumented 
explanatory variables. In order to calculate the indirect effects, the model is required to converge. As 
the model contains several reciprocal feedback loops (݁݃:ܣўM, ܣўH, ܣўR) it can only converge 
if the absolute value of the largest eigenvalue of ȳ is less than one (Paxton, Hipp, Marquart-Pyatt, & 
Marquart, 2011). If convergence is achieved, the indirect effect of the endogenous and explanatory 
variables can be obtained respectively by equation (10) and (11) with I the identity matrix (Paxton et 
al., 2011). 
 ൦
ܯ௜
ܣ௜
ܴ௜
ܪ௜
൪=൦
0 ߛଵଶ ߛଵଷ ߛଵସ
ߛଶଵ 0 ߛଶଷ ߛଶସ
ߛଷଵ ߛଷଶ 0 ߛଷସ
ߛସଵ ߛସଶ ߛସଷ 0 ൪ × ൦
ܯ௜
ܣ௜
ܴ௜
ܪ௜
൪ +
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
Eଵଵ … Eଵ௡
Eଶଵ ڮ Eଶ௡
Eଷଵ ڮ Eଷ௡
Eଷଵ ڮ Eସ௡ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې × ൥ݔଵڭ
ݔ௡
൩+ ൦H௜ଵH௜ଶH௜ଷ
H௜ସ
൪  (8) 
 ܻ = ߁ܻ + ܤܺ + ܧ (9) 
 
௬ܰ௬ = (ܫ െ ߁)ିଵ െ ܫ െ ߁ (10) 
 
௬ܰ௫ = (ܫ െ ߁)ିଵܤ െ ܤ (11) 
 
5. Empirical results  
The first part of this section discusses the regression results of our model. We calculate the indirect 
and total effects in section 5.2. The remainder of section 5 contains some robustness tests (section 
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5.3), a simple model to test if the MICPD allows households to live in larger houses (section 5.4) and 
the estimation of the MICDP effect on mortgages taken out after the acquisition year (section 5.5). 
5.1. Parameter estimates and discussion  
Table 3 shows the estimation results. Our model performs relatively well,  as indicated by the Harel 
combined Mc Elroy adjusted R² of 0.81. We verify the rank condition in Appendix 6. Appendix 7 
shows that the Sargan test for over-identifying does not reject the null hypothesis of valid over-
identifying restrictions for all four equations. According to the Hausman test, the 3SLS estimation is 
consistent. The dependent variables of the second and third equation are expressed in logarithms, so 
we will discuss the exponentiated regression coefficients of these equations. The inverse Mills ratio 
shows up significantly in the mortgage maturity and the mortgage amount equation, which means 
that estimating without the inverse Mills ratio would produce biased results. 
First, we will discuss the mortgage maturity estimates. A 10% increase in the average mortgage 
amount would extend mortgage maturity by only a month. This indicates that the indirect effects on 
mortgage maturity through the amount borrowed might be small as well. The real mortgage rate and 
the house price do not directly affect the mortgage maturity. Adjustable-rate mortgages are on 
average 10 months longer than fixed-interest mortgages. Adjustable mortgage-takers are more likely 
to be income-constrained (Linneman & Wachter, 1989) and they need more time repay their 
mortgage. The gross permanent income does not directly affect the mortgage maturity. Consistent 
with Leece (1997), we find that older households repay their mortgage faster. Although Sa-Aadu and 
Sirmans (1995) observed lower mortgage maturities for younger and thus more mobile households, 
we could not confirm this non-linear age effect. Self-employed households do not have longer 
maturities. Households working in the financial sector often get performance-related wages, which 
makes them take out mortgages with longer maturity to cope with the income volatility. In contrast 
to self-employed households, financial sector workers still have a fixed income share, which may be a 
reason why the demand effect predominates the supply effect. Another explanation is suggested by  
Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer (2014), who suggest that households employed in the financial sector 
might have easier access to financial products. Those households may choose longer mortgages to 
ensure enough financial means to invest in alternative assets. Although the coefficient on education 
is negative as expected, it is not significant. The number of children does not significantly affect 
mortgage maturity.  The sign of  the coefficient   is  in  line with  Dhillon et al. (1990). They assign the 
longer maturities of households with children to their lower mobility. We find that the smallest 
houses require longer mortgages. Probably house size captures an additional wealth effect in the 
maturity equation. Households who buy smaller houses are more financially constrained and they 
need to take out longer mortgages. In line with section 2, we find that mortgages have on average 
had longer maturities since 2005. Our key variable here, the maximum annual net tax benefit of the 
MICPD,  is  not  significant  at  the  10%  level.  Hence,  we  reject  the  hypothesis  that  households  are  
encouraged by financial institutions to take out mortgages with longer maturities.  
From the mortgage amount estimation, we learn that a household can borrow on average 4.8% more 
if  the  mortgage  maturity  is  raised  by  one  year.  The  most  important  determinant  of  the  mortgage  
amount is the house price. An elasticity of 0.622 is observed which means that a €10 000 increase in 
the selling price enables an extra €6 220 to be borrowed. As in the maturity equation, the coefficient 
for the mortgage rate is insignificant. Possibly the mortgage rate influences the timing of borrowing 
rather than the mortgage amount. The amount borrowed for mortgages with renovation and 
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purchasing purposes is about 14% higher than that for acquisition purposes only. If the household 
has a second mortgage on the HMR, the size of the mortgage under investigation is 40% (i.e. 1- exp(-
0.542))  lower  than  the  average  mortgage  in  the  sample.  Households  with  mortgages  for  other  
property than the HMR borrow on average 44% (i.e. exp(0.365)-1) more than households without 
such mortgages. Perhaps those households are more creditworthy as they own a second property. It 
is also possible that they need to borrow more as they have a lower down payment.  The estimated 
permanent income coefficients support Follain and Dunsky (1997)’s  theory of a non-linear 
permanent income effect as the relationship is positive for liquidity-constrained households and 
negative for non-constrained households. However, the estimated coefficients are not significant. 
Apparently, permanent income affects the mortgage amount only indirectly. Likewise, an inheritance 
or  gift  prior  to  the  mortgage  only  affects  mortgage  amount  through  its  effect  on  the  house  price.  
Unlike Black, Schweitzer, and Mandell (2001) & Vandell and Thibodeau (1985), we do not find that 
the fluctuating income of the self-employed restricts the granted mortgage amount. Maybe self-
employed households have greater mortgage demand as they invested their savings in their own 
business.  The future income prospects of those with higher education increases the mortgage 
amount granted by 8%. Households with children aged 18 years or older have larger mortgage 
amounts than average. Those households might experience an increase in income in the near future 
when their children leave home. New houses require an estimated 15% (i.e. 1-exp(-0.158)) less 
borrowing than existing houses. This may capture another wealth effect; households who can afford 
new construction have less need for a loan. Another reason for the smaller borrowed amount might 
be that they already owned the residential land prior to the mortgage. According to our estimates, 
the mortgage amount has been significantly lower since 2005, which does not tally with the trend 
seen in chart 4. Apparently, the other variables in the model like rising house prices, increasing 
permanent income and falling mortgage rates already pick up the increase in the mortgage amount. 
The significant negative coefficient for the 2005-2010 dummy possibly describes the gap which arose 
between mortgage and house price growth, due to the injection of capital in the real estate market 
and the greater preference for starter dwellings, as discussed in section 2. The tax benefit variable 
has a significant positive effect on the mortgage amount. An increase in the maximum annual net tax 
benefit of €100 would result in a 1.3% higher mortgage amount. For the average home loan, this is 
an increase of  €1 500,  or  about  €72 per  year.   This  suggests  that  70% of  the maximum annual  net  
benefit ends up in the mortgage amount. If we consider the range of the tax benefit for the MICPD-
eligible borrowers, we find that eligible households have on average 12% to 38% higher mortgages 
than the non-eligible borrowers who have taken out their mortgage since 2005.  
All the endogenous variables significantly affect the mortgage rate equation. As the mortgage is not 
significant in the other equations, it seems that the mortgage rate is the result of the other mortgage 
characteristics rather than their determinant. A higher loan-to-value ratio pushes up the risk 
premium on the mortgage rate, which is confirmed by the mortgage amount and house price 
coefficients. Although, the negative coefficient of the mortgage maturity seems counter-intuitive, it 
is in line with empirical evidence from Page (1964), Sandor and Sosin (1975) and Titman, Tompaidis, 
and Tsyplakov (2005). These authors argue that lower monthly payments, resulting from a longer 
mortgage maturity, may reduce the risk of default.  They explain that the difference between current 
income and permanent income can be responsible for the inverse relationship between the 
mortgage maturity and the interest rate. Young professionals have low current incomes, but high 
potential and thus a high permanent income. Although they need longer maturities, their credit risk 
is low. Likewise, older employees have a higher current income but a lower permanent income due 
to  their  imminent  retirement.  Although  they  can  afford  shorter  maturities,  they  have  a  lower  life  
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expectancy and thus a higher credit risk. They also suggest that neighbourhood characteristics might 
be included in the mortgage maturity. Houses in less desirable neighbourhoods have shorter and 
more uncertain life spans which results in shorter maturities. Their last interpretation is that lenders 
refuse to grant long maturities on risky loans which results in shorter risky loans and longer risk-free 
loans.  An elasticity of 066 confirms that the interest on government bonds is the main determinant 
of the individual mortgage rate. As expected, we find that variable mortgages rate are significantly 
lower than fixed rates, but the mortgage purpose does not affect the rate of interest on it. The higher 
credit risk of households with a second mortgage for the HMR raises the mortgage rate by more than 
one percentage point,  whereas  the lower  credit  risk  of  two mortgage-takers  reduces  the mortgage 
rate  by  half  a  percentage  point.  The  permanent  income  only  indirectly  affects  the  mortgage  rate  
through the house price. The sign of the self-employed is in accordance with Vandell and Thibodeau 
(1985), who find that self-employed mortgage-takers have higher default rates due to their volatile 
income. However, the coefficient is not significant. Financial sector employees obtain lower 
mortgage rates. A discount on the mortgage rate may be a benefit enjoyed by financial sector 
employees. Additionally, it will be less costly and time-consuming to screen the creditworthiness of 
the  bank  employee  as  the  financial  institution  is  already  aware  of  his  or  her  income.  Another  
explanation might be that a financial sector employee is more informed and knows exactly when to 
take out the most advantageous mortgage. Whether a household has had tertiary education or has 
adult children does not seem to affect the risk premium on the mortgage rate, but the number of 
children does significantly affect the mortgage rate. The number of children is used as a proxy for risk 
aversion (Breslaw, Irvine, & Rahman, 1994) which brings down the mortgage risk premium. 
Households with (more) children are more risk averse because they take future expenses, like 
schooling, into account (Brueckner & Follain, 1988) and their transaction costs of default are higher 
(Capozza, Kazarian, & Thomson, 1997). Lenders do not incorporate the annual tax benefit into the 
mortgage rate.  
Nearly all coefficients in the house price equation are significant and have the expected signs. The 
mortgage amount elasticity is 0.61.  Houses with renovation mortgages have 20% lower house prices 
than houses with purchase mortgages. As the latter need no or less renovation, it is obvious that 
they are more expensive.  Contracting two mortgages for the same dwelling is more common for a 
more expensive dwelling. As said before, the permanent income tends to determine the house prices 
instead of the mortgage characteristics. At the average house price, about 36% of a monthly increase 
in the gross permanent income by €100 ends up in the housing bid. Households that received an 
inheritance or gift prior to the acquisition of their home have on average 11% higher house price 
than households who did not receive an inheritance or gift.  The house prices for households in the 
age groups between 18 and 35 do not differ significantly from each other. For older age groups, the 
effect  of  age  on  the  house  price  is  linear,  except  for  the  46  to  50  year-olds.  The  self-employed  
variable is insignificant like in the other three equations. The smallest dwellings are on average 33% 
(i.e.  1-exp(-0.413))  cheaper  than  the  largest  dwellings.  New  houses  are  on  average  23%  more  
expensive than existing houses, which is not surprising, as the construction of new houses requires 
the latest materials and needs to comply with stricter standards. The acquisition year, which is 
included to control for the increasing house price trend, is insignificant. Possibly other included 
explanatory variables, like rising permanent income, already capture this effect. Keeping all other 
factors constant, houses prices in 2005-2010 are on average 25% higher than house prices before 
2005. Several unobserved variables may be responsible for this price rise. Higher demand and better 
quality of the dwellings may have pushed up house prices since 2005. The growth of the Belgian 
population and the even larger increase in the number of households has boosted demand for real 
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estate. Houses are better equipped (underfloor heating, home automation, security systems, etc.) 
and energy-saving measures are taken (insulation, double glazing, green energy, etc.) which might 
increase house prices as well. Our variable of interest, the maximum annual net tax benefit, does not 
significantly affect the house price. Hence, we find no evidence of a direct capitalisation effect of the 
MICPD in the house price.  
 
5.2. Direct versus indirect effects 
In this section, we discuss the indirect and total effects of the explanatory variables on mortgage 
maturity, mortgage amount, the mortgage rate and the house price. The computation is possible as 
the simultaneous equation model converges.19 In order to calculate the indirect and total effects, all 
insignificant coefficients in table 3 are set to zero. The direct effects of the endogenous dependent 
variables can be found in rows 2 to 5 of table 3, whereas the direct effects of the exogenous variables 
are  shown  in  the  remaining  rows  of  the  table.  We  calculate  the  indirect  effects  of  all  explanatory  
variables according to equations 8 and 9, but we only show the effects of the tax benefit variable.  
  
                                                             
19 Convergence of the model is achieved, as the absolute eigenvalues of the B matrix are all smaller than one. 
The eigenvalues are -0.701 0, 0 and 0.701. 
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Table 4 Direct, indirect and total effects of the tax benefit 
Estimated coefficients Direct effect TB1 = 1 Indirect effect TB1 = 1 Total effect TB1 = 1 
Mortgage maturity / 0.055  0.055  
Mortgage amount 1.288% 1.244% 2.532% 
Mortgage rate / 0.026 %point 0.026 %point 
House  price / 1.553% 1.553% 
Sample average Direct effect TB1 = 1 Indirect effect TB1 = 1 Total effect TB1 = 1 
21 years / 3 weeks 3 weeks  
€ 118 274 € 1 514 € 1 471 € 2 985 
2.008% / 0.026 %point 0.026 %point 
€ 164 458 / € 2 554 € 2 554 
MICPD eligible households' average Direct effect TB1 = 21.351 Indirect effect TB1 = 21.351 Total effect TB1 = 21.351 
23 years / 14 months 14 months 
155 026 € € 42 642 € 41 181 € 83 823 
1.386% / 0.547 %points 0.547 %points 
€ 199 916 / € 67 597 € 67 597 
Data source: HFCS (2013). Note: the second column of the first panel shows the direct effects of a change in the maximum 
annual  net tax benefit  variable by 100€ (or by 1 in TB1) on the dependent variables. / means that there is no significant 
effect. The third column shows the indirect effects of a change in the tax benefit variable by 100€ and the last column adds 
up the second and third columns. The second panel illustrates the size of the direct, indirect and total effects of the same 
change in the tax benefit for the sample averages of the dependent variables. The third panel shows the size of the effects 
for the average values of endogenous variables the MICPD-eligible households.  
 
The first panel of table 4 shows the estimated direct, indirect and total effects of a one-unit increase 
in ܶܤଵon the dependent variables. The second panel illustrates these effects for the average values 
in our sample. In the third panel, we use the averages of the MICPD-eligible households.  The first 
column  of  the  second  panel  shows  the  average  values  for  respectively  the  mortgage  amount,  the  
mortgage maturity, the mortgage rate and the house price. As the mortgage amount significantly 
appears in the other three equations, the direct effect of ܶܤଵon the mortgage amount indirectly 
affects the mortgage maturity, the mortgage rate and the house price as well. The mortgage maturity 
increases indirectly by 3 weeks, which is a negligible effect. The indirect effect of the mortgage rate is 
negligible too. The total interest costs for a fixed-rate mortgage, with the average characteristics of 
our sample, would only go up by €370. The house price rises indirectly by 1.553% or by €2 554 at the 
sample’s  average  house  price.   Due  to  its  indirect  effect  on  the  mortgage  maturity  and  the  house  
price and the feedback loops, the tax benefit indirectly affects the mortgage amount as well. The 
total impact on the mortgage amount is 2.53%. If we apply this to the average mortgage amount, we 
find  a  total  increase  of  €2  995.   Although  the  effect  of  the  tax  benefit  on  the  mortgage  rate  is  
negligible, the total interest cost would be higher due to the bigger mortgage amount. An increase in 
the maximum annual net tax benefit by €100 and a consequently higher mortgage amount of €12 
126  would  increase  the  total  interest  costs  by  €1  532,  under  the  assumption  that  the  mortgage  
maturity and the mortgage rate stay unchanged. Due to the higher mortgage amount, the notary 
fees and the credit insurance fee may be higher too, which might push up the housing costs even 
more. 
The given numbers in the first two panels are the effects of a change in the maximum annual net tax 
benefit of €100. In section 4.1, we said that ܶܤଵ varies between 9.15 and 29.75 in our sample. The 
effect of the tax benefit on the mortgage amount and the house price might therefore be even 
larger.  The  maximum  annual  net  tax  benefit  in  the  first  ten  years  of  the  mortgage,  for  a  couple  
household without children and both mortgage-takers in the 40% tax bracket would be €2 372. The 
maximum annual net tax benefit in the first ten years of the mortgage for a similar couple, but with 
both mortgage-takers in the 45% tax brackets would be about €300 higher. According to our 
estimates, the MICPD makes the second couple borrow 7.6% more and pay 4.66% more for the same 
dwelling than the first couple. In the third panel, we look at the effect of the average maximum 
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annual net benefit for MICPD-eligible households.20 This is the maximum annual net tax benefit in 
the first 10 years of the mortgage for a couple household with three children. The marginal tax rates 
of both mortgage takers are 30% and 40%. The table indicates that they would borrow €83 000 more 
than non-eligible households who have acquired a dwelling since 2005. The direct effect is €41 181 
which almost equals the total maximum net tax benefit over the whole mortgage duration, which 
works  out  at  €41  68021. This result suggests almost full capitalisation of the net tax benefit in the 
mortgage  amount  equation.  The  effect  on  the  mortgage  maturity  and  the  mortgage  rate  are  no  
longer negligible either. The mortgage maturity increases by 14 months and the mortgage rate goes 
up by 0.5% points.  
5.3. Robustness  
We perform several robustness tests. We start with some adaptations to the estimation model. Next, 
we use other variables than TB1 to capture the effect of the MICPD. Lastly, we alter the size of the 
dataset.    
First,  we  estimate  the  same  model  as  in  table  3  with  2SLS  instead  of  3SLS,  because  the  former  
approach is more robust in case of misspecification. Second, we estimate the model without the 
logarithmic  transformation  of  the  mortgage  amount  and  the  house  price.  This  will  give  a  clearer  
picture of the size of the tax benefit’s effect than the logarithmic case. Third, we drop the mortgage 
rate equation as it performs significantly less than the other models. Fourth, we used TB2 instead of 
TB1 as the tax benefit decreases after the first 10 mortgage years. A possible problem with using the 
maximum annual net tax benefit is that it depends on the gross permanent income. In the 
introduction, we explained that the total tax benefit of the MICPD over the loan life could be a large 
amount. If TBT alters the permanent income, we still have an endogeneity problem. Therefore, we re-
do the estimates with the maximum annual deduction per household (DA1) instead of the net tax 
benefit TB1. Sixth, we use a dummy variable for MICPD-eligible households. We restrict the sample to 
mortgages  with  a  maturity  of  at  least  ten  years  so  that  the  eligibility  does  not  depend  on  the  
mortgage length. Seventh, we extend the sample with mortgages taken out one year after the 
acquisition year. For these mortgages, it is likely that the dwelling changed owners at the end of the 
year, whereas the mortgage started only at the beginning of the next year. In the eighth robustness 
test,  we  restrict  our  sample  to  mortgages  taken  out  between  2000  and  2010,  which  reduces  the  
selection  bias.  Finally,  we  limit  the  sample  to  mortgages  taken  out  since  2005.  We  want  to  
investigate whether the non-inclusion of the tax benefits prior to 2005 inflated our results. The 
limited sample no longer makes it possible to estimate four equations simultaneously. Therefore, we 
only include the mortgage amount and the house price equation.  
Table 5 only shows the estimated tax benefit coefficients for the mortgage amount equation. The 
MICPD proxies in the mortgage maturity, the mortgage rate and the house price equations are still  
insignificant in all specifications, whereas all MICPD variables are significant in the mortgage amount 
equation.  All robustness tests confirm the results of our basic estimation model. Most coefficients of 
the MICPD variable  fluctuate around 0.013,  which is  the size  of  the effect  we found in  section 5.1.  
We find a larger effect in the non-logarithmic specification than we found in panel 2 of table 4. This 
may  be  partly  explained  by  the  average  house  price  being  €18  000  higher  than  the  average  
logarithmic house price. The coefficient of TB2 is slightly larger than the coefficient of TB1, which is as 
expected, as a one-unit change in TB1 corresponds to a smaller change in TB2. The coefficient of the 
maximum annual deduction is less than half the size of the coefficient of the maximum annual net 
                                                             
20 The average of the MICPD-eligible households actually equals 21.77362, but we choose the closest existing 
ܶܤଵ  in our sample.  
21 10*21.2351*100+13*15.63744*100. 
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tax  benefit.   This  result  is  comparable  to  the effect  of  the maximum annual  net  tax  benefit,  as  the 
annual deduction is on average more than twice the size of the annual net tax benefit. We find an 
average increase in the mortgage amount of 29.9% for MICPD-eligible mortgages. As the average 
annual maximum net tax benefit of the MICPD in our sample is €2 177, this result is comparable with 
0.013% for an annual maximum net benefit of 100. In the last robustness test, we again find an 
insignificant effect of the tax benefit in the house price equation and a significant effect in the 
mortgage amount equation. The size of the TB1 coefficient indicates that the ignorance of the benefit 
system prior to 2005 does not inflate our estimation results.  
Table 5 Robustness test 
Tax benefit coefficient in amount equation 
Nr robustness test coef se Harel Mc Elroy R² n 
Model adaptation 
1 2SLS 0.013*** 0.005 0.770 346 
2 no LN 2053.330*** 710.359 0.760 346 
3 no R-equation 0.013*** 0.005 0.826 346 
Change in tax benefit variable 
4 TB2 0.017*** 0.006 0.803 346 
5 DA1 0.006*** 0.002 0.791 346 
6  MICPD dummy 0.299** 0.128 0.763 343 
Different dataset  
7 -1<LY- AY<2a 0.014*** 0.005 0.807 353 
8 2000-2010 0.014** 0.005 0.824 252 
9 2005-2010 0.012* 0.007 0.787 130 
Source: HFCS (2013) & FPS Economy (2015).  
Notes: *** (**) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
a LY= loan year, AY= acquisition year. This simultaneous 
equation model contains only two equations, the mortgage amount and the house price equation.  
5.4. House size  
Our results suggest that the MICPD might push up the mortgage amount and the house price. 
Supporters of the MICPD system would probably argue that the households are still better off with 
the subsidy, because it allows them to acquire a higher quality dwelling. Although this is not what the 
MICPD was intended for, it would mean that households enjoy some benefits of the MICPD as well. 
Unfortunately, the HFCS dataset does not contain a broad range of dwelling characteristics and only 
makes it possible to estimate whether the MICPD enables households to buy larger dwellings. As the 
house size is only available in categories, an ordered probit analysis with fixed cut-off points is 
estimated. The advantage of this interval regression technique is that the estimated coefficients can 
be interpreted as if we observed the exact house size for each observations (Woolridge, 2010, pp. 
508-509). As the house size is only reported in 2010, it is possible that the current house size differs 
from the house size in the acquisition year due to construction works. However, as none of the 
households in the sample took out a second mortgage after the acquisition year, it is reasonable to 
assume that no large expansions have been undertaken. Moreover, the house size has to increase a 
lot to end up in a higher size category. 
House size depends on the location of the dwelling, the scarcity of the land, the household budget s, 
the current household size, planned family extension, household characteristics and preferences. As 
the HFCS dataset does not contain all those determinants for the acquisition year, we will estimate a 
simplified house size regression. Table 6 shows the estimates.  
The household budget is definitely important for the house size as shown by the coefficients of the 
permanent income and the value of a gift or an inheritance. An extra household member adds about 
10m² to the house. The age coefficients are counter-intuitive as households in the [36-40] category 
buy significantly smaller houses than the 26-30 year-olds. We test if this is due to selection bias or a 
time trend by including the inverse Mills ratio in the house size regression (ii) and some period 
dummies  in  regression  (iii).  The  mortgages  on  the  left-hand  side  of  chart  6  are  all  taken  out  by  
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younger households because older mortgage-takers are less likely to be still observed in the sample 
thirty years later. Moreover, unobserved time varying factors, like the demand for smaller houses 
due to diminishing household size or an increasing number of families, might bias the age 
coefficients.  
The insignificant inverse Mills ratio in regression (ii) does not change the age coefficients, which 
means that the selection bias cannot explain the unexpected age coefficients. The insignificance of 
the period dummies in regression (iii) points out that the age coefficient is not significantly biased by 
time varying factors either. We can think of one possible explanation why the 36 to 40 year-olds buy 
the smallest residences. Becoming a homeowner at the age of 40 is rather late. Those households are 
possibly more financially constrained than households who need fewer years to save for the down 
payment. We used several variables to control for the effect of planned family expansion on the 
house size: a dummy variable for family expansion since the acquisition year (regression (iv) in table 
6), the number of newborn children since the acquisition year, a dummy variable for children born in 
the first two years following the acquisition year and so on. None of the family expansion dummies 
was significant. Maybe the households surveyed had not yet decided about expanding their family 
when buying the house or they bought a starter dwelling and reckoned that the small children could 
still share a room. 
Table 6 House size regressions 
  House size 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
  coef se coef se coef se coef se 
Intercept 115.869*** 12.669 107.152*** 15.355 116.818*** 13.225 115.840*** 12.687 
Permanent income 5.145*** 1.691 5.625*** 1.776 5.082*** 1.683 5.124*** 1.701 
Value of inheritance or gift 1.390* 0.728 1.391* 0.734 1.342* 0.728 1.388* 0.730 
Household size 9.938*** 3.184 9.941*** 3.175 9.852*** 3.224 9.931*** 3.183 
Family expansion - - - - - - 0.718 8.311 
Mean household age                 
  (ref.: [26-30])                 
[18-25] 7.835 10.959 6.711 10.967 8.125 10.998 7.832 10.972 
[31-35] -13.461 8.317 -14.668* 8.477 -14.042* 8.399 -13.426 8.419 
[36-40] -23.540** 10.421 -24.884** 10.461 -25.566** 10.576 -23.443** 10.456 
[41-45] -8.156 12.254 -10.942 12.574 -9.263 12.312 -7.979 12.565 
[46-50] -20.351 12.527 -21.653* 12.544 -22.305* 12.652 -20.189 12.756 
[51-65] -11.555 16.487 -24.624 19.324 -14.915 16.482 -12.442 16.659 
New estate  12.851* 7.659 12.518* 7.656 14.160* 7.875 12.831* 7.675 
2005-2010 -14.578 12.925 -8.639 13.848 -11.411 12.964 -14.554 12.93 
1995-1999 - - - - 4.600 8.689 - - 
1990-1994 - - - - -13.263 11.57 - - 
1985-1989 - - - - 2.338 15.725 - - 
1980-1984 - - - - -0.469 37.265 - - 
TB1 0.564 0.547 0.535 0.543 0.443 0.531 0.562 0.548 
੮;Ǌ)/ʔ(Ǌ) - - 16.333 13.300 - - - - 
sigma 51.800*** 3.528 51.752*** 3.531 51.666*** 3.522 51.802*** 3.528 
Observations 346 346 346 346 
 Source: HFCS (2013) & FPS Economy (2015). Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. 
 
The tax benefit variable remains insignificant in all the specifications. This result suggests that the 
extra mortgage amount is not spent to acquire a higher quality dwelling, which would mean that the 
target group of the MICPD does not benefit at all from the MICPD.  
5.5. Type-2 mortgages  
Finally, we investigate whether the MICPD actually did affect the mortgage and the real estate 
market differently for mortgages taken out after the acquisition year. As the house is already 
acquired at that point, the MICPD cannot capitalise into higher house prices anymore. The deduction 
might affect a renovation or an expansion in three ways. First, it is possible that the renovation 
becomes more affordable due to the MICPD. In another beneficial option, the tax benefit is used to 
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carry out larger or higher quality renovation work. The third option is unfavorable for households as 
the tax benefit is capitalised in the renovation or expansion cost. 
We re-estimate the model with the second types of mortgage included in the sample but without the 
house price equation.22 We expect the effect of TB1 on the amount of the second mortgage type 
(type2) to be smaller than on the mortgages taken out in or before the acquisition year. Households 
with mortgages to expand or renovate their house might be less credit-constrained than households 
who use a mortgage to acquire their dwelling. We want to investigate whether the former are less 
inclined to borrow more by including an interaction effect between TB1 and type2. We also include 
an interaction effect between type2 and the period since 2005 to control for factors different from 
the MICPD (e.g. renovation premiums) that might have influenced the characteristics of the second 
mortgage types differently than acquisition mortgages.  
 
Table 7 Regression results simultaneous equation model – type 2 mortgages  
  Mortgage maturity Mortgage amount Mortgage rate 
  coef se coef se coef se 
Intercept 15.775 19.748 4.236 1.715 -7038 6.769 
Mortgage maturity  - - 0.049*** 0.010 -0.179*** 0.062 
Mortgage amount  2.257*** 0.754 - - 2.277*** 0.744 
House price -1.796 1.556 0.545*** 0.141 -1.253 0.592 
Mortgage rate  0.201 0.210 -0.021 0.021 - - 
Interest on government bonds     - - 0.678*** 0.057 
Variable mortgage rate 1.217*** 0.466 - - -0.653*** 0.192 
Mortgage purpose (ref: purchase HMR)           Renovation - - -0.641*** 0.110 1.752*** 0.590 
Purchase HMR and renovation - - 0.060 0.078 -0.138 0.312 
Other mortgage for HMR - - -0.445*** 0.080 1.123** 0.441 
Two mortgage-takers       -0.853** 0.254 Other property mortgage       - - Permanent income  -0.122 0.142 -0.004 0.049 -0.013 0.061 
Permanent income ²  - - -7E-08 3.37E-07 - - 
Inheritance or gift - - -0.041 0.052 - - 
Mean household age (ref: [26-30]) - -       [18-25] 1.467** 0.742 - - - - 
[31-35] -0.711 0.567 - - - - 
[36-40] -2.217*** 0.702 - - - - 
[41-45] -3.162*** 0.932 - - - - 
[46-50] -6.352*** 0.900 - - - - 
[51-65] -6.940* 1.257 - - - - 
Self-employed -6.940*** 1.257 0.145** 0.074 0.007 0.287 
Financial sector  -1.277* 0.695 - - -0.927*** 0.29 
Tertiary education -0.827 0.541 0.118** 0.060 0.103 0.246 
Number of children 0.338 0.213 - - -0.092 0.085 
Nest leavers  - - 0.458** 0.184 -0.815 0.841 
House size (ref.:  ш200m²) - - 0.535*** 0.191     
[50m²-80m²[ 5.353*** 1.54 - - - - 
[80m²-100m²[ 0.928 1.027 - - - - 
[100m²-120m²[ 0.262 0.763 - - - - 
[120m²-150m²[ 0.397 0.672 - - - - 
[150m²-200m²[ -0.225 0.546 - - - - 
New house 0.093 0.562 -0.119** 0.060 - - 
2005-2010 1.747* 0.995 -0.305*** 0.114 0.457 0.424 
Type2 -0.738 1.160 0.196* 0.119 0.742* 0.421 
Type2*(2005-2010) -3.200 2.009 -0.168 0.193 0.801 0.741 
TB1 0.066 0.040 0.014*** 0.005 -0.008 0.018 
TB1*Type2 -0.026 0.070 1.338E-04 0.008 -0.011 0.028 
੮;Ǌ)/ʔ(Ǌ) 1.712 0.897 -0.225 0.086 - - 
Harel adj. R² 0.480 0.594 0.179 
Harel Mc Elroy R² 0.638 
Observations  414 
Data sources: HFCS (2013) & FPS Economy (2015).  Note:  *** (**) (*) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) 
level.  
                                                             
22 Mortgages taken out one year after the acquisition year are considered as acquisition mortgages as the 
seventh robustness test did not point up any significant difference with other acquisition mortgages. 
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Table  7  indicates  that  the  MICPD  effect  does  not  significantly  differ  for  both  mortgage  types.  An  
increase in the maximum annual net tax benefit by one unit pushes up the mortgage amount by 
1.35% for both mortgage types. As the average mortgage amount in this sample is 102,689€, 1.35% 
corresponds  to  an  increase  in  the  mortgage  amount  of  1,398€,  which  is  close  to  the  increase  we  
found in Section 5.1. This result suggest that the MICPD may also increase the amount of mortgages 
taken out after the acquisition year. The extra mortgage amount might be capitalized in the 
renovation cost or the households may use it to finance higher quality renovations. Like in section 
5.4,  we  estimate  an  interval  regression  to  find  out  if  the  MICPD  for  the  second  mortgage  type  
permits households to increase their house size. The same interaction effects as in table 7 are added 
to the model. We expect a negative coefficient for the interaction effect between type2 and 2005-
2010 as the average size of renovation mortgages has decreased since 2005. Table  8  shows that  a  
one-unit increase in TB1 increases the house size with 2.077m². These results suggest that the MICPD 
might be beneficial for the second type of mortgage takers as it permits households to improve the 
quality of the house. 
 
Table 8 House size regression – type 2 mortgages 
  coef se 
Intercept 101.471*** 15.197 
Permanent income 6.770*** 1.675 
Inheritance or gift 1.364* 0.705 
Household size 9.370*** 2.929 
Mean household age (ref: [26-30])     
[18-25] -4.487 10.696 
[31-35] -18.667* 10.742 
[36-40] -31.409*** 12.059 
[41-45] -28.301** 13.389 
[46-50] -20.522 13.437 
[51-65] -41.920** 17.412 
New house 12.565* 6.959 
2005-2010 -1.967 13.137 
Type2 38.132** 17.097 
Type2 *(2005-2010) -70.166*** 27.187 
TB1 0.491 0.526 
TB1*Type2 2.077** 0.998 
੮;Ǌ)/ʔ;Ǌ) 32.816*** 11.640 
Sigma 51.421*** 3.158 
Observations 414 
Source: HFCS (2013) & FPS Economy (2015). Note:  *** (**) (*) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
In this paper, we attempt to detect the transmission channel of the Belgian mortgage interest and 
capital tax deduction (MICPD) into higher house prices. To have any capitalisation at all, the tax 
deduction needs to be included in the housing bid. Our results suggest that the mortgage market 
might be responsible for the transmission of the MICPD into higher house prices. We used the HFCS 
consumption dataset to estimate the mortgage maturity, the mortgage amount, the mortgage rate 
and the house price in a simultaneous equation model. The maximum annual net tax benefit of the 
MICPD is included as an explanatory variable in each equation. Although our sample is rather small, 
the results indicates that the tax benefit has no direct effect on the house price, the mortgage 
maturity and the mortgage rate, but it might increase the mortgage amount. An increase in 
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mortgage demand would make housing more affordable in an elastic housing market, but more 
expensive in an inelastic housing market, like the Belgian one. As the mortgage amount shows up 
significantly in the three other equations, the tax benefit may indirectly affect the mortgage 
maturity,  the mortgage rate  and the house price  as  well.  Calculation of  the indirect  effects  for  the 
average mortgage in our sample suggests that an increase in the maximum annual net benefit of the 
MICPD by €100 raises the house price by 1.5%. The maximum annual net tax benefit of the MICPD in 
our sample varies between €915 and 2 975, which implies that the increase in the amount borrowed 
can be rather large. This may also indirectly push up the total interest costs, through longer mortgage 
maturities and higher mortgage rates. Although our estimation method has some limitations, the 
results suggest that the MICPD may generate even more costs for the households instead of bringing 
any benefit. The results of our house size regressions suggest that the higher mortgage amount is not 
used to acquire higher quality dwellings. Only for mortgages taken out after the acquisition year, the 
extra mortgage amount might be used to finance a higher quality renovation or expansion.  
Two  groups  are  more  likely  to  benefit  from  the  MICPD  than  home  owners  do:  the  lenders  might  
receive more mortgage interest payments and the estate agent or the previous home owner might 
get a higher price for their house. Unfortunately, these are not the target groups for the subsidy, 
which again shows that the MICPD is ineffective. Two aspects of the MICPD are responsible for its 
ineffectiveness. First, households receive the subsidy gradually over the years of the mortgage, which 
does not facilitate the down payment requirement. A one-time subsidy would give a clearer signal 
than an annual windfall in the tax return. Second, conditioning the eligibility of the MICPD on an 
already granted mortgage introduces an intermediate channel. This permits other parties, different 
from the new owners, to benefit from the MICPD as well.  
If Belgian home ownership has to be further subsidised, a better alternative for the MICPD is a one-
time subsidy, which is straightforward and does not involve other parties beside the household and 
the government. Although partial capitalisation into higher house prices cannot be prevented in an 
inelastic supply market, one can prevent third parties from benefiting from the subsidy.  
In  the  context  of  the  sixth  State  reform,  federal  housing  taxation  powers  were  transferred  to  the  
Regions. Moreover, the tax deduction was converted into a tax credit of 40% for all taxpayers in the 
Brussels and Flemish Region, whereas a tax credit of 45% is applicable in the Walloon Region 
(MICPC).   From  the  tax  year  2015  onwards,  the  Flemish,  the  Walloon  and  the  Brussels-Capital  
Regions can set their own housing policy. The Flemish Region was the first to reform the MICPR. The 
annual indexation of the MICPC was abolished and the maximum amount in the first ten years cut by 
€760. Although the incidence is smaller, it is likely that lenders and estate agents will still benefit 
more from the Flemish MICPR than prospective buyers will. Moreover, the Flemish MICPDC has been 
extended to second properties as well.  For mortgages issued from 1 January 2016, the Walloon 
Region replaced the MICPC with a new tax credit: the chèque habitat or housing cheque. This new 
annual housing benefit is still conditioned on the possession of a mortgage of at least 10 years and 
still depends on the size of the mortgage repayments and the insurance premiums. Contrary to the 
previous system, renovation mortgages cannot benefit from the housing cheque and the size of the 
benefit  decreases  with  income.  Households  with  an  annual  income  of  €81  000  or  more  are  not  
eligible at all. Other mortgage-takers can obtain a fixed benefit of €125 per child and a variable 
benefit of minimum €755 and maximum €1 520. After the first 10 years, the benefit will be reduced 
by 50%.  The benefit  can be obtained for  at  most  20 years.  The same criticism as  in  in  the Flemish 
case  applies  to  the  new  Walloon  system:  lenders  and  realtors  might  still  benefit  from  the  benefit.   
Moreover, if the Walloon benefit is also capitalized into the housing market, housing might become 
relatively more expensive for lower income households. From 2017 onwards, the Brussels-Capital 
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Region replaced the MICPC by a  discount  on the transaction costs  of  €21 875.  This  means that  no 
transaction tax is required on dwellings of less than €175 000. House purchases of more than €500 
000 cannot benefit from the discount. Such a system gets rid of the transmission channel and 
provides a straightforward subsidy to the households. However, it favors existing housing over new 
housing as no transactions costs are paid on new construction. Possibly, the new Brussels tax benefit 
tempers the demand for new construction, which might lead to an outdated housing stock in the 
long run. The housing supply should be increased to restrict capitalisation of the tax credit in house 
prices, which will be another challenge for the regional governments.  
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Appendix
Appendix 1 Representativeness of the HFCS  
The first table shows some statistics of different mortgage types for the Belgian mortgage market.  
The first part of the table covers the period 1995-2010, whereas the second and third part of the 
table split the considered period in two. Statistics on the Belgian mortgage market are not available 
prior to 1995. The second table shows the characteristics of the outstanding mortgage loans in the 
HFCS for the same periods. The acquisitions prior to 1995 are left out to ensure comparability with 
table 1.  
 
Belgian mortgage market number total amount                 average amount average  ARM share average 
refinanced mortgages  511  43 760  85 587  
4.59 31% NA 
non-refinanced mortgages 2 832  260 122  91 845  
purchase 1 812  197 104  108 777  
renovation 593  22 315  37 605  
purchase & renovation 234  26 095  111 564  
other 193  14 609  75 734  
initial mortgage year BEFORE 2005 (1995-2004) 
refinanced mortgages  365  29 040  79 648  
5.45 33% NA 
non-refinanced mortgages 1 480  124 841  84 346  
purchase 994  93 291  93 892  
renovation 232  9 332  40 205  
purchase & renovation 145  14 265  98 378  
other 109  7 954  72 702  
initial mortgage year SINCE 2005 (2005-2010) 
refinanced mortgages  147  17 788  121 254  
3.17 29% 
 16.5 years 
in 2005, 18 
years in 
2010 
non-refinanced mortgages 1 352  135 282  100 053  
purchase 818  103 813  126 849  
renovation 361  12 983  35 935  
purchase & renovation 89  11 830  133 070  
other 84  6 655  79 706  
Sources: Number & amount: NBB Stat, Online Database (Other financial statistics); Average real interest: Semi fixed mortgage rate CGER / 
Fortis Bank / BNP Paribas Fortis Bank, 2015. ARM share:  Financial Stability Review NBB (2011, Chart 6 Mortgage market developments in 
Belgium )  Maturity: CKP, 2010, p. 8;  De Doncker, 2006, p. 8.  Note: Mortgage amounts are expressed in real prices. 
 
Only outstanding mortgages are observed in the HFCS dataset, which creates a selection bias 
problem, which is discussed more thoroughly in section 4.2. Although this problem prevents 
comparison of the number of newly granted or refinanced mortgages, we can compare the average 
mortgage amount for different loan types. Owing to the selection bias, the share of longer mortgages 
is  relatively  higher  in  the  sample  than  in  the  Belgian  mortgage  market,  which  explains  the  higher  
average loan amounts in the HFCS for all mortgage types before 2005. As most mortgages have 
maturities of at least 5 years, the selection bias does not prevent the comparison for mortgages 
taken out since 2005. The average granted amount for non-refinanced and renovation mortgages 
since 2005 almost equals the Belgian average. Despite the selection bias, we do observe a larger 
average amount for non-refinanced mortgages since 2005 than before 2005 in both tables. Only 
renovation  mortgages  are  smaller  since  2005  than  before  2005  in  both  tables.  The  average  real  
mortgage  rate  is  lower  for  mortgages  taken  out  after  2004  than  before  2005  in  both  tables.  The  
share of adjustable-rate mortgages in the HFCS is smaller since 2005 than before, which is consistent 
with the first table and chart 2. The average share of granted mortgages with an initial fixed-rate 
period  of  at  least  ten  years  equals  71%.  In  the  HFCS,  29%  of  the  mortgages  in  the  sample  have  
adjustable-rate mortgages, where the interest rate is allowed to vary from time to time during the 
life of the mortgage.   
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HFCS sample  number total amount average amount  
average 
real 
interest 
ARM share 
average 
maturity 
refinanced mortgages  112 15 710 133  140 269  2.25 40% 17.83 
non-refinanced mortgages 623 79 895 687  128 243  2.17 32% 18.45 
purchase 470 67 417 010  143 440  2.11 33% 19.22 
renovation 76 3 146 531  41 402  2.55 19% 13.26 
purchase & renovation 48 6 595 954  137 416  1.91 41% 20.83 
other 29 2 736 192  94 351  2.35 23% 14.43 
initial mortgage year BEFORE 2005 (1995-2004) 
refinanced mortgages  53 8 542 649  161 182  2.62 46% 18.16 
non-refinanced mortgages 314 38 614 365  122 976  2.50 32% 18.89 
purchase 259 33 341 880  128 733  2.53 35% 19.01 
renovation 23 1 270 384  55 234  2.06 13% 16.82 
purchase & renovation 21 2 574 298  122 586  2.36 48% 19.45 
other 11 1 427 802  129 800  3.22 25% 19.38 
initial mortgage year SINCE 2005 (2005-2010) 
refinanced mortgages  59 7 167 483  121 483  1.94 31% 17.55 
non-refinanced mortgages 309 41 281 322  133 597  1.81 29% 18.08 
purchase 211 34 075 130  161 494  1.15 31% 19.57 
renovation 53 1 876 146  35 399  2.72 21% 11.75 
purchase & renovation 27 4 021 655  148 950  1.61 38% 21.85 
other 18 1 308 389  72 688  1.88 20% 11.38 
Note: Mortgage amounts are expressed in real prices. The total number differs from the 706 mortgages we considered in 
the data section of the Working Paper, as mortgages that are taken out for other properties than the HMR are included as 
well. 
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Appendix 2 Variable definitions 
Dependent variables Definition 
Mortgage maturity Duration of the mortgage at the time of the borrowing  
Mortgage amount LN (the initial amount borrowed/CPI with base year 2010) 
House price  LN (the house price in the loan origination year/CPI with base year 2010). This equals the 
acquisition value for loans taken out in the acquisition year. For the other loans, the house price 
in the mortgage year is calculated as the house price in the acquisition year multiplied by the 
ratio of the average Belgian house price in the loan year and the average Belgian house price in 
the acquisition year.  
  
  
  
  
Mortgage rate Current  (annual)  rate  of  interest  charged  on  the  loan,  resulting  from  the  most  recent  rate  
fixation) less inflation.    
Mortgage characteristics    
Interest on government 
bonds  
Long-term interest on government bonds 
Two mortgage takers 0 for single mortgage-takers, 1 for two mortgage-takers  
Renovation The mortgage is used to refurbish or renovate the residence 
Purchase HMR and 
renovation 
The mortgage is used to purchase the household main residence and to refurbish or renovate it  
Other m rtgage for HMR The household has a second mortgage to finance the household main residence  
Type 2  1 if the mortgage is taken out two years after the acquisition year or more 
Household characteristics    
Permanent income Estimated permanent income, expressed in €10 000  
Permanent income² Squared estimated permanent income, expressed (in €10 000) 
Mean household age (Age  of  the  reference  person  in  the  loan  origination  year  for  a  single  household,  age  of  the  
reference person and his partner in the loan origination date)/2 for 2 mortgage-takers. Age is 
divided into 7 categories.  Reference category: [19-25] 
  
  
Tertiary education At least one of the household heads has a tertiary education  
Self-employed At least one of the household heads is self-employed 
Financial sector At least one mortgage-taker works in the financial sector                                                                                          
(code high-level SNA/ISIC aggregation A*10/11 NACE-category=K)   
Retired borrower 1 if a single mortgage-taker is retired or if both of the couple mortgage-takers are retired 
Number of children Number of children born before or in the acquisition year 
Nest leavers  1 if the households has children of 18 year or older in the loan origination  year 
Family expansion 1 if children are born in or after the acquisition year  
Household size Number of household members in the loan year 
Inheritance or gift The household has received an inheritance or a gift prior to the loan year  
Value of inheritance or gift  Value of the gift or inheritance that the household received prior to the acquisition year (in €10 
000)   
Other property mortgage 1 if the household possesses a second property and a mortgage to finance it in the loan year of 
the HMR mortgage   
Other property 1 if the household possesses a second property, different from the HMR in the survey year 
TB1 0 for non-eligible households, the maximum annual net benefit for the first 10 mortgage years  
  for eligible households 
TB2 0 for non-eligible households, the maximum annual net benefit from the 11th mortgage year  
  onwards for eligible households 
DA1 0 for non-eligible households, the maximum annual deduction for the first 10 mortgage years 
for eligible households   
MICPD dummy 0 for non-eligible households, 1 for eligible households 
Dwelling characteristics    
New house 1 if  the acquired dwelling is a new house, 0 if it is an existing house 
House size The size category of the residence (living area) in square meters.  Reference category: ш200m² 
Acquisition year  The year in which the HMR was acquired 
Other variables    
2005-2010  1 if the mortgage is taken out between 2005 and 2010, 0 if it is taken out prior to 2005 
Inverse mills ratio ੮;Ǌ)/ʔ;Ǌ) The inverse Mills ratio of the fitted value of the selection regression (see 4.2)  
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Appendix 3 Permanent income 
Parameter estimates 
Permanent income  
  coef se 
Constant 10.971*** 0.088 
Age centered 0.002 0.003 
Age centered² -4.323E-04*** 0.000 
Number of children 0.013 0.019 
Number of other properties 0.077*** 0.024 
Bonds 0.073 0.068 
Shares 0.117** 0.047 
Other financial assets 0.061 0.102 
Savings accounts 0.111** 0.057 
Credit card 0.200*** 0.045 
High income reference period 0.049 0.084 
Low income reference period -0.107** 0.054 
Job, education and marital status (reference category:  two working, married persons with tertiary education) 
Two persons working, …     
… married, one tertiary education, one lower -0.081 0.081 
… married, with secondary education -0.279*** 0.088 
… married, one secondary education, one lower -0.668*** 0.230 
… cohabiting, with tertiary education -0.025 0.102 
… cohabiting, one tertiary education, one lower -0.167 0.145 
… cohabiting, with secondary education -0.107 0.155 
… cohabiting, with primary education -2.511 0.586 
Two married persons, with tertiary education on sick, maternity leave 1.046* 0.590 
One person working, one not working, …     
… married, with tertiary education -0.310*** 0.109 
… married, with secondary education -0.509*** 0.102 
… married, with primary education -0.940*** 0.231 
… cohabiting, with tertiary education -0.078 0.202 
… cohabiting, with secondary education -0.521*** 0.179 
… cohabiting, with primary education -0.601 0.588 
Two married persons, one on leave with tertiary education, one non-working  -1.220*** 0.418 
Two persons retired, …     
… married, with tertiary education -0.273 0.192 
… married, one tertiary and one lower education -0.227 0.157 
… widowed + new partner, one tertiary and one lower education -0.308 0.588 
… married, with secondary education  -0.539*** 0.131 
… married, one secondary and one lower education -0.658*** 0.190 
… married, with primary education -0.505** 0.261 
… widowed+ new partner, with primary education -0.468 0.590 
One retired and one non-working person, … -0.661*** 0.209 
… married, with tertiary education -0.831*** 0.154 
… married, with secondary education  -1.339*** 0.303 
… married, with primary education -0.773** 0.343 
… cohabiting, with secondary education -1.039* 0.589 
… cohabiting, with primary education -0.831 *** 0.180 
Two non-working, married persons -1.321*** 0.345 
Two non-working cohabiting persons      
Single household, … -0.669*** 0.077 
… with a regular job, tertiary education -0.853*** 0.086 
… with a regular job, secondary education -1.166*** 0.171 
… with a regular job, primary -1.011** 0.405 
… on sick or maternity leave  -1.254*** 0.148 
… unemployed -1.333*** 0.220 
… non-working -1.333*** 0.220 
N= 1029 Harel R²=0.45 
Data sources: HFCS (2013) & FPS Economy (2015). Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) 
level. 
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Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Age centered Household age in 2010 - average household age in the sample 
Age centered squared Age centered²  
Number of children Number of children in 2010 
Number of other properties Number of other properties in the survey year  
Bonds 1 if household owns bonds in 2010 
Shares 1 if household owns shares in 2010 
Other financial assets 1 if households owns assets such as options, futures, index certificates, precious 
metals, oil and gas leases, proceeds from a lawsuit or estate that is being settled, 
royalties or other 
Savings accounts 1 if the household owns saving accounts, time deposits, certificates of deposits or other 
such deposits 
Credit card 1 if one of the household member owns a credit card  
High income reference period 1 if the household income is unusually high compared to a normal year  
Low income reference period 1 if the household's income is unusually low compared to a normal year  
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Appendix 4 Number of households per tax rate 
Single households 
 
Couple households 
Tax rate   
 
Tax rate 0% 25% 30% 40% 45% 50% 
0% 6 
 
0% 9 - - - - - 
25% 0 
 
25% 0 0 - - - - 
30% 2 
 
30% 7 0 2 - - - 
40% 7 
 
40% 8 6 15 15 - - 
45% 49 
 
45% 2 2 20 47 81 - 
50% 24 
 
50% 2 1 14 31 64 6 
Data source: HFCS (2013). 
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Appendix 5 Selection regression 
  participation 
  coef se 
Intercept -211.305*** 15.588 
Retired borrower  -0.566*** 0.217 
Other property -0.201 0.130 
Permanent income 0.162 0.117 
Permanent income² -9.294E-07 9.174E-07 
Inheritance or gift 0.077 0.146 
Mean household age (ref.: [26-30])     
[18-25] -0.034 0.166 
[31-35] 0.156 0.139 
[36-40] -0.378** 0.167 
[41-45] -0.527*** 0.195 
[46-50] 0.464* 0.248 
[51-65] -1.393*** 0.259 
[66-80] 2.348*** 0.468 
Tertiary -0.077 0.126 
Self-employed 0.005 0.156 
Financial sector 0.679*** 0.230 
Couple 0.165 0.148 
Children  0.023 0.059 
House size (ref.: ш200m²)     
[50m²-80m²[ 0.105 0.241 
[80m²-100m²[ 0.035 0.203 
[100m²-120m²[ 0.317** 0.163 
[120m²-150m²[ 0.296** 0.149 
[150m²-200m²[ 0.043 0.127 
New construction 0.108 0.111 
Acquisition year  0.106*** 0.008 
Null deviance: 1436. 17 on 1047 degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 918.23 on 1023 degrees of freedom 
Observations 1048 
Data sources: HFCS (2013) & FPS Economy (2015). Notes: This is the first stage of the two-stage Heckman procedure, which 
is described in section 4.2. This is the selection regression for imputation file 1. As the regressions for imputation files 4 to 5 
are comparable, we did not report them. 
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Appendix 6 rank condition  
We apply the rank procedure described in (Gujarati, 2004, p. 752). The matrices below show the non-zero 
coefficients of the variables included in the system but excluded from respectively the mortgage maturity 
equation (A), the mortgage amount equation (B), the mortgage rate equation (C) and the house price equation 
(D). The R rank matrix function (Bates & Maechler, 2016) is used  to calculate the rank of the matrixes. As the 
rank of the matrices equals the number of equations -1, the rank condition is satisfied.  
 
A =   
                                                                                                                               
 
 
B = 
൭
2.30 0 0.88 0 1.48 0 െ2.52 െ3.37 െ5.89 െ10.46 1.59 0 3.77 0 0 0 0 02.48 0.66 െ0.46 െ0.54 0 0 0 0 0 0 െ0.92 െ0.18 െ0.175 0 0 0 0 00.61 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.15 0.23 0 0.49 0 0 െ0.41 െ0.27 െ0.15 െ0.17 െ0.08 0൱ 
 
 
C = 
൭
0 0 0 0 1.48 0 െ2.52 െ3.37 െ5.89 െ10.46 3.77 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.590 0.36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 െ0.16 0 െ0.280 0 0 0.11 0 0.07 0.15 0.23 0 0.49 െ0.41 െ0.27 െ0.15 െ0.17 െ0.08 0.20 0 0 ൱ 
 
D = 
 ൭
0 0 0.88 0 0 0 0 1.59 0 0 4.590.62 0 0 0 0.36 0 0.08 0 0 0.28 െ0.28
െ1.46 0.66 െ0.46 െ0.54 0 0 0 െ0.92 െ0.18 0 0 ൱ 
ݎܽ݊݇(ܣ) = ݎܽ݊݇(ܤ) = ݎܽ݊݇(ܥ) = ݎܽ݊݇(ܦ) = 3 
 
  
൭
0.05 0 0 0.13 -0.52 0 0 0 0.28 െ0.16 0
െ0.25 0.66 0 0 1.23 െ0.54 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 െ0.22 0.42 0 0 0.11 0 0.2 0൱
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Appendix 7 Sargan’s test of over-identifying restrictions  
Equation Sargan’s statistic p-value Degrees of freedom 
Mortgage maturity 7.688 0.464 11-3 
Mortgage amount 14.909 0.384 17-3 
Mortgage rate 14.909 0.384 17-3 
House price 2.040 0.980 11-3 
Data sources: HFCS (2013) & FPS Economy (2015). 
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